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I. Introduction
The image of the disproportionately African-American and
poor urban jury redistributing wealth has dominated the political
debate surrounding the tort system for the past generation. Peter
Huber, a leading spokesperson for the tort reform movement in
its early years, argued that “[i]f the new tort system cannot find a
careless defendant after an accident, it will often settle for a
merely wealthy one.” 1 In The Bonfire of the Vanities, novelist Tom
1. See PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 12 (1988) (asserting further that juries are “committed to
running a generous sort of charity”); see also Sidle v. Majors, 341 N.E.2d 763,
771 (Ind. 1976) (acknowledging “the ‘Robin Hood’ proclivity of juries” and noting
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Wolfe characterized any jury in Bronx County, New York as a
“vehicle for redistributing the wealth,” 2 and, in the process,
coined the term “Bronx jury.” In the real world, Frank Popoff,
then President and CEO of Dow Chemical Company, angrily
argued that the jury was all black after it returned a $75 million
dollar punitive damage verdict against his company. 3
This Article examines how judicial and legislative perceptions
that race and income inequality affect jury deliberations impact
the substance of a state’s articulated rules governing tort law. 4
Our focus is not on whether the racial composition or degree of
income inequality within the population from which the jury pool
is drawn in fact affects jury determinations of either liability or
damages. 5 Instead, we examine whether appellate courts,
consciously or subconsciously fearing that urban juries will be
unfair to businesses and insured defendants, strike preemptively
to prevent tort cases from ever reaching juries. 6 We also consider
whether a state’s history as part of the South and the political
leanings of its government affect whether its substantive law
makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to reach the jury. 7
Beginning in the mid-1960s, American tort law shifted
dramatically in a pro-plaintiff direction. 8 The common element
that “[t]he tendency to take from the rich and give to the needy is as American
as apple pie”).
2. TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 406 (Picador 2008) (1987); see
also Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial
Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 784 (1996) (arguing that “the only institutions
in America where people of color have the power to make immediate wealth
redistribution decisions are urban governments and juries”).
3. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE
CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 286–87 (1996) (pointing out
that after making this statement, Popoff immediately had to backtrack to avoid
accusations of racism).
4. See infra Part III (identifying and discussing factors that commonly
decide which states follow traditional tort doctrines restricting liability in
personal injury cases).
5. See infra notes 182–185 and accompanying text (discussing how
demographics impact the way juries make decisions).
6. See infra Part IV (describing how the Jury Access Denial Index (JADI)
is used to evaluate the appellate courts of various states).
7. See infra Part IV.B (noting that in many instances, Southern courts
appear to be more inclined to prevent cases from reaching juries).
8. See Robert L. Rabin, Judge Jack Weinstein and the World of Tort:
Institutional and Historical Perspectives, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 641, 641 (2015)
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among the many changes that occurred during the following two
decades was that they enabled personal injury victims to have
their cases decided by juries rather than dismissed by trial
judges. Although these changes were pervasive, they were not
uniform among the states. Some states, notably California, 9 often
were bellwethers of pro-plaintiff changes in tort law, while other
states, particularly some in the South, failed to join the trend.
These pro-plaintiff changes exhausted themselves in the late
1980s when they were checked by pro-defendant “tort reform”
enacted by state legislatures facing intense political backlash
from businesses and insurance companies. 10
We begin with the hypothesis that judges and state
legislators often believe that juries with a substantial percentage
of African-American or low-income jurors are more inclined to
find for personal injury victims and award them higher damages
and that these perceptions have led them to adopt rules making
It is conventional wisdom that tort law entered a new era . . . around
1960 . . . cut[ting] across virtually all categories of liability for
unintentional injury. These developments included recognition of new
and expansive duties of . . . care in personal injury claims for
landowner liability . . . and eroded existing defenses (contributory
negligence . . .) and immunities . . . .
See also DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 27 (2d ed. 2014) (“It is probably fair to say that tort law expanded the rights of
injured persons during much of the 20th century at various rates of expansion
up until around 1980 or perhaps a little earlier.” (footnote omitted)). Most often,
these changes resulted from judicial decisions. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975) (adopting pure comparative fault); Mounsey v.
Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973) (holding that “we no longer follow the
common law distinction between licensees and invitees and, instead, create a
common duty of reasonable care which the occupier owes to all lawful visitors”).
But in a number of instances, the pro-plaintiff changes came from legislative
action. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (c) (2014) (adopting modified
comparative liability); N.J. STAT. § 2A:22A-5 (2015) (establishing dramshop
liability).
9. See Peter H. Schuck, Introduction to TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 1, 19 (Peter H.
Schuck ed., 1991) (describing “the California, New Jersey, and New York courts”
as “being in the vanguard” as they “imposed new, more expansive duties to
protect or avoid harm to others”).
10. See Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, “Off to the Races”: The 1980s Tort
Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 207, 210–11 (1990)
(reporting that “the great majority of states . . . enacted tort reform legislation
between 1985 and 1988 . . . in response to an insurance crisis”).
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it more difficult for plaintiffs to have their cases decided by
juries. 11
We further examine whether a state’s history as part of the
slaveholding South, a factor obviously linked with race, correlates
with a higher degree of denying personal injury plaintiffs access
to juries. 12 Southern states typically have adopted more
conservative policies on any number of issues, not just those that
disadvantage personal injury plaintiffs. 13 For example, economist
Paul Krugman noted that it was mostly formerly slaveholding
Southern states that refused, under the Affordable Care Act, to
expand Medicaid to “provide major benefits to millions of their
citizens, pour billions into their economies, and help support their
health-care providers,” all on the federal government’s tab. 14 He
asked, “Is America doomed to live forever politically in the
shadow of slavery?” 15 We ask the same question in the context of
tort law.
During the period extending from the mid-1960s through the
mid-1980s, Southern judges often refused to adopt pro-plaintiff
doctrines in tort law that would have made it easier for plaintiffs
to have their cases decided by the jury. 16 They apparently feared
that Southern blacks, many only recently registered to vote and
serving as jurors in significant numbers for the first time, would
seek to redistribute wealth or retaliate for historic, and often
continuing, mistreatment. 17 Accordingly, we assess the effect that
11. See infra Part III.A (reporting that, even today, many trial lawyers are
convinced that black juries are pro-plaintiff).
12. See infra Part III.B (explaining that both Southern courts and
businesses feared black jurors would use their power in the court to strike back
at those whom they felt oppressed them).
13. See Paul Krugman, Opinion, Slavery’s Long Shadow, N.Y. TIMES (June
22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/opinion/paul-krugman-slaveryslong-shadow.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2016) (noting that Southern whites have
had very strong Republican leanings ever since the Nixon administration) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See infra Part III.B (explaining how a mixture of Southern suspicion of
African-American jurors, together with the South’s pro-business politics of the
1960s, influenced courts not to adopt increasingly pro-plaintiff tort doctrines
that prevailed elsewhere).
17. See infra Part III.A.1 (stating that even today, many attorneys still
view black jurors as potential social wealth redistributors).
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being a Southern state has on tort law because of its interactions
with race and income inequality. 18
We also explore a possible correlation between the political
leanings of a state’s government and the extent to which its tort
law makes it difficult for the plaintiff to have her case decided by
the jury. 19 Tort law has become highly politicized in the last
generation. 20 Conservatives attack “out of control” juries that
imperil American businesses, and they promote pro-business
“tort reform.” 21 In contrast, liberals see the tort system as a
means of holding corporations accountable for their harmful
Hence,
it
is
plausible
to
assume
that
conduct. 22
conservative-leaning states impose more obstacles to the plaintiff
reaching the jury than do liberal-leaning states. 23
The tort law of seventeen states provides the basis for our
comparisons. 24 In order to test for correlations between the extent
that a state denies personal injury plaintiffs the opportunity to
18. See infra Part IV.C, E & F (describing how the authors discovered a
strong association between Southern states whose largest cities include high
percentages of African-American residents and tort law doctrines making it
difficult for plaintiffs’ cases to reach the jury).
19. See infra Parts III.C & IV.G (describing possible correlation between
political conservatism and anti-jury doctrines and finding such a correlation in
1980 but not in 2010).
20. See infra notes 250–258 and accompanying text (discussing tort
reform).
21. See Robert A. Levy, Do’s and Don’ts of Tort Reform, CATO INST. (May
2005), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/dos-donts-tort-reform (last
visited Apr. 13, 2016) (listing awards such as a $145 billion punitive damages
verdict as being an example of tort abuse) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
22. See Brendan Fischer, Justice Denied: 71 ALEC Bills in 2013 Make It
Harder to Hold Corporations Accountable for Causing Injury or Death, PR
WATCH (July 10, 2013, 7:31 AM), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2013/
07/12172/justice-denied-71-alec-bills-2013-make-it-harder-hold-corporationsaccountable-ca#sthash.Kj90WwvY.dpuf (last visited Apr. 13, 2016) (arguing that
tort liability is necessary to prevent dangerous corporate actions, citing the
quintessential example of a crib manufacturer ignoring safety guidelines) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
23. See infra Part III.B.2 (noting that the transition of Southern states
from Democratic leaning to Republican-leaning in the last half of the twentieth
century corresponds with the persistence of doctrines making it more difficult
for personal injury plaintiffs to have their cases heard by juries).
24. See infra notes 266–268 and accompanying text (discussing selection of
states used for comparative study).

564

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (2016)

have their cases decided by the jury and each of the factors of
race, income inequality, history as a part of the South, or the
political leanings of state governments, or any combination
thereof, we constructed a numerical index, the Jury Access
Denial Index (“JADI”). 25 Each state’s JADI quantifies the extent
to which the tort law of that state impedes a plaintiff’s access to
the jury compared with the tort law of other states.
Determining each state’s JADI in turn required two steps.
First, we selected five sets of legal issues that are important in
determining which personal injury cases survive the legal
gauntlet and move forward for jury deliberations. We asked a
panel of twelve experienced and highly regarded judges and
practitioners to assess how important each of these factors is in
comparison to each other in order to assign each its appropriate
weight in determining the Jury Access Denial Index. 26 Second, we
researched the law on each of these issues in each of the
seventeen states. 27 We then multiplied our quantitative
assessment of the extent to which each state continued to adhere
to an older doctrine, such as contributory negligence as a total
bar to recovery, and the weight assigned to such a factor by the
panelists experienced in tort litigation. We totaled these products
for each of the five sets of issues for a particular state to
determine that state’s JADI. Using each state’s JADI, we
conclude in Part IV.B by ranking the states in order of the degree
to which each state’s substantive law doctrines impedes a
personal injury plaintiff’s ability to have her case decided by the
jury. 28
Our next step was to perform a multivariate analysis with
the four variables of income inequality, race, region, and the

25. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the various criteria behind the JADI
index).
26. See infra note 264 and accompanying text (explaining the selection of
an equal number of judges, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and defense attorneys).
27. See infra Appendix A (describing the research procedures).
28. See infra note 269 and accompanying text (noting that the JADI
measures only the impact of substantive law doctrines in preventing cases from
reaching the jury and not judicial tendencies in ruling on such matters).
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political ideology of each state’s government. 29 The results
confirm at least two of our hypotheses. 30
First, a clear positive relationship exists between the
percentage of African-Americans in a state’s largest cities and its
continuing acceptance of doctrines that impede the plaintiff’s
access to the jury. 31 This relationship is both statistically and
substantively significant, and independent of any effects
resulting from either the degree of income inequality present in
the state’s large urban areas or the region of the country in which
the state lies. 32
Second, a state’s geographic location within the South yields
the most powerful effect on the extent to which the state denies
jury access to tort plaintiffs; again, this correlation is both
statistically and substantively significant. 33 This finding is not
surprising because during the late 1960s through the mid-1980s,
when most other states adopted changes to tort law that
increased plaintiffs’ access to juries, appellate courts in the South
often failed to join the trend. 34
Our analysis of whether the other two variables, income
inequality and political ideology, affect a state’s tort law yields
less clear results. 35 Our findings suggest a weak positive
association between the degree of income inequality within a
state’s largest cities and the degree to which its tort law makes it
difficult for plaintiffs in personal injury cases to have their cases
29. See infra Part IV.B (recording how the authors chose seventeen states
that varied in terms of racial demographics, Southern history, politics, and
common ideologies to provide a complete and diverse analysis).
30. See infra Part IV.D (testing for correlation between a state’s tort law
doctrines and a high percentage of African-Americans in its largest cities); see
also infra Part IV.E (looking for correlations between the JADI score of a
particular state and its history as part of the South).
31. See infra Part IV.D.
32. See infra Part IV.C (expounding upon how the Gini coefficient was used
to determine income inequality).
33. See infra Part IV.E (illustrating this conclusion).
34. See infra Appendix A, tbl.3 (reporting that during the mid-1900s,
Southern courts often retained judicial doctrines making it more difficult for
plaintiffs to have their cases heard by juries).
35. See infra Part IV.F (explaining that findings of associations from
bivariate analyses should not be over-interpreted because of complex
interactions with other variables).
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decided by juries. 36 Surprisingly, however, the correlation is not
statistically significant. 37
Finally, our analysis suggests that the relationship between
the political leanings of a state’s government and its degree of
jury-access denial is somewhat complicated. 38 On one hand, as
anticipated, we found a positive correlation between the extent to
which a state’s tort law impeded a plaintiff’s access to the jury
and its level of political conservatism in 1980—at the end of the
period when most courts had moved tort law in a decidedly proplaintiff direction. 39 On the other hand, when we tested the
relationship between political conservatism and jury-access
denial in 2010, the association has actually reversed: a state’s
level of conservatism is now correlated with easier access to the
jury. 40 This can be partially explained by the fact that tort law
has remained comparatively stable since the mid-1980s, while the
political leanings of state governments have often changed
dramatically. Even accounting for these changes, however, we
conclude that race and region are far better predictors of a state’s
JADI than is political ideology. 41
Part II considers the role of substantive legal doctrines in
determining whether the personal injury victim is able to have
her case decided by the jury. 42 Subpart A describes the expansion
of jury access for plaintiffs that was concentrated in the two
decades between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. 43 Subpart B
36. See infra note 278 and accompanying text (analyzing the data on
income inequality).
37. See infra note 277 and accompanying text (analyzing the connection
between jury awards and income inequality and concluding no statistically
significant relationship).
38. See infra Part IV.G (discussing the complications when analyzing JADI
and political orientations of state governments).
39. See infra note 283 and accompanying text (noting that Figure 5 shows
that in 1980, more liberal states generally had adopted tort doctrines making it
easier for plaintiffs to have their cases reach juries).
40. See infra note 284 and accompanying text (observing that by 2010,
liberal political leanings of state governments were associated with a greater
prevalence of anti-jury tort doctrines).
41. See infra Part IV.G (explaining that a correlation between JADI and
political ideology was expected, but only a confusing and inconsistent
association was found).
42. Infra Part II.
43. Infra Part II.A.
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then identifies five sets of substantive rules that traditionally
kept plaintiffs’ cases from juries and continue to do so in a
minority of states: (1) contributory negligence as a total bar to
recovery; (2) limited duty rules in premises liability cases; (3) no
duty or limited duty rules in other contexts; (4) rules limiting the
liability of charitable institutions; and (5) restrictive rules
governing the admissibility of expert scientific testimony. 44
In Part III, we review several variables that scholars,
practitioners, or judges have identified as affecting the
development of tort law. 45 Subpart A describes the widely held
belief
among
practitioners
and
some
scholars
that
African-American jurors favor plaintiffs in personal injury
litigation, both in determining liability and in assessing
damages. 46 The Subpart also covers the often overlapping topic of
whether low-income jurors tend to favor plaintiffs and
redistribute wealth in tort litigation. 47 Subpart B explores the
reasons why the substantive law in states that were once a part
of the segregated South potentially poses more obstacles to
personal injury plaintiffs seeking to have their cases decided by
juries than does the law in other regions of the country. 48 Finally,
Subpart C considers a possible alternative explanation, that the
substantive law rules we identified may be most closely
correlated with the political leanings of a state’s governmental
leaders. 49
Part IV describes our methodology for testing the hypotheses
that we derived from the analysis previously presented, as well as
the results of our analysis. 50 Subpart A explains the process for
developing a Jury Access Denial Index that quantifies the extent
to which any particular state’s law creates obstacles for the
personal injury plaintiff to have her case decided by the jury
instead of having it dismissed by the trial court judge. 51 Subpart
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Infra Part II.B.
Infra Part III.
Infra Part III.A.
Infra Part III.A.
Infra Part III.B.
Infra Part III.C.
Infra Part IV.
Infra Part IV.A.
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B describes how we selected the seventeen states whose tort law
we studied. 52 We then rank the seventeen states in terms of their
JADIs, that is, the degree to which the law of each state creates
substantive law obstacles to the plaintiff having her case decided
by the jury. 53
The later Subparts of Part IV evaluate whether there are
statistically significant correlations between the extent to which
each state’s law impedes access to the jury and the factors,
previously described in Part II, that may affect the extent of jury
access denial. 54 In Subpart C, we evaluate whether a state’s JADI
is correlated with the degree of income inequality within a state’s
largest municipalities. 55 Subpart D considers whether a state’s
JADI is correlated with the percentage of African-Americans in
the populations of the state’s largest cities. 56 In Subpart E, we
test the possible impact of a state’s history as part of the South. 57
In Subpart F, we evaluate possible interactions among the
variables of race, income inequality, and regional history in
affecting its JADI. 58 Finally, Subpart G considers whether the
political ideology of a state’s government and its voters is
correlated with a state’s JADI. 59
In Part V, we conclude and briefly address the normative
implications of our findings. 60
II. The Role of Substantive Law in Denying Plaintiffs Access to
Juries
The most important issue in the practice of personal injury
law is how difficult it is for plaintiffs to have their cases heard by

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Infra Part IV.B.
Infra Part IV.B.
Infra Part IV.G.
Infra Part IV.C.
Infra Part IV.D.
Infra Part IV.E.
Infra Part IV.F.
Infra Part IV.G.
Infra Part V.
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juries. 61 Judges and attorneys assume that juries will favor
injured victims and not defendants—typically either businesses
or other insured defendants. 62 Most tort claims are resolved out of
court through the settlement process, 63 but the perceptions of

61. See generally HARRY SHULMAN ET AL., LAW OF TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (6th ed. 2015)
[I]n most cases, the lawyer for the plaintiff wants the case to be heard
and decided by the jury. . . . Conversely, the lawyer representing the
defendant wants to prevent the jury from deciding the case.
Accordingly, much of the tort litigation process can be understood as
the struggle between the plaintiff’s attorney and defense counsel as to
whether the case will be decided by the jury or whether instead it will
be decided by the judge “as a matter of law.”
Cf. J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1713, 1738 (2012) (describing impact of court’s decision taking case from jury
through granting of summary judgment motion on settlement value). As early
as the mid-nineteenth century, a New York trial court judge explicitly addressed
the issue:
We can not shut our eyes to the fact that in certain controversies
between the weak and the strong—between a humble individual and
a gigantic corporation, the sympathies of the human mind naturally,
honestly and generously, run to the assistance and support of the
feeble, and apparently oppressed; and that compassion will
sometimes exercise over the deliberations of a jury, an influence
which, however honorable to them as philanthropists, is wholly
inconsistent with the principles of law and the ends of justice. There,
is therefore, a manifest propriety in withdrawing from the
consideration of the jury, those cases in which the plaintiff fails to
show a right of recovery . . . .
Haring v. New York & E.R. Co., 13 Barb. 9, 15–16 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1852).
62. See, e.g., 2 FRED LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 9:2 (3d ed. 2014)
(advising that “[t]he ‘little guy’ usually has an advantage with a jury . . . against
a corporation, a prominent or wealthy person, a railroad, or an insurance
company”). But see LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, NCJ-223851, CIVIL
BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 3–4 (rev. ed. 2009),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf (reporting that a comprehensive
study by the U.S. Department of Justice shows that the plaintiffs won in only
51.3% of all tort cases).
63. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement
Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 129 (2009)
(finding a settlement rate in a sample of tort cases in federal courts to be 87.2%);
Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation?
Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 40 (2002) (finding
“settlement rates for some type of cases—such as torts—exceeding 90 percent”).
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counsel for the parties as to whether a case will reach the jury is
certainly an important determinant of settlement value. 64
In this Part, we identify five sets of substantive law
doctrines 65 that affect whether the trial judge will grant either a
motion for a summary judgment or a motion for a directed
verdict, removing the case from the purview of the jury. Even
earlier in the litigation process, plaintiff’s counsel in a personal
injury case, almost always compensated on a contingent fee
basis, 66 generally declines to accept a case when the facts suggest
that the case is unlikely to make it to the jury.
Factors other than the content of substantive law, notably
state or even local judicial practice, significantly affect the
probability that the trial judge will dismiss cases, 67 but our focus
is only on substantive legal principles that play important roles
in dismissing tort cases. Before identifying doctrines that deny
the tort plaintiff access to the jury, we begin by tracing how most
states moved, during the period of the mid-1960s through the
mid-1980s, toward making it easier for tort plaintiffs to have
their cases decided by juries.

64. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2004) (“The conventional wisdom is that litigants
bargain toward settlement in the shadow of expected trial outcomes.”).
65. One of the issues, the admissibility of expert testimony, is really a
matter of evidence law rather than tort law, but substantially impacts whether
the tort case is heard by the jury. See infra notes 129–147 and accompanying
text (explaining the standards for qualifying experts).
66. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency
Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 267 n.1 (1998) (reporting that in
“personal injury cases . . . research shows that virtually all plaintiffs pay their
lawyers on a contingency basis”).
67. See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment
Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 902
(2007) (acknowledging that variations in “circuit law, local rules, and casemanagement practices . . . and judicial philosophies . . . across the districts”
influence the variations in summary judgment filing and grant rates across
those districts).
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A. The Expansion of Jury Access in Tort Law
During the classical era of tort law, 68 extending from the late
nineteenth century into the mid-twentieth century, judges
frequently articulated specific rules that enabled them to decide
cases as a matter of law without submitting them to the jury.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the most influential torts theorist of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, reasoned that
“[i]f . . . the ordinary liabilities in tort arise from failure to comply
with fixed and uniform standards of external conduct, . . . it ought
to be possible . . . to formulate these standards . . . and . . . to do
so must . . . be the business of the court.” 69 Professor (later Judge
and then Justice) Holmes continued, “A judge . . . ought gradually
to acquire a fund of experience which enables him to represent
the common sense of the community in ordinary instances far
better than an average jury. . . . [T]he sphere in which he is able
to rule without taking their opinion at all should be continually
growing.” 70 Edward White, in his history of American tort law,
writes that “[a]s a judge, Holmes enjoyed taking negligence cases
away from the jury.” 71
The rule-based approach of Holmes and his contemporaries
came under attack by the legal realist movement during the
period beginning in the 1920s and lasting into the 1950s. 72 As
Harry Shulman and Fleming James, Jr., realist editors of a
68. We refer to the classical era of tort law as the period beginning with the
emergence of negligence “as a comprehensive principle of tort law . . . that came
to dominate tort law,” and extended, with ebbs and flows, until the period of the
mid-1960s. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY 13 (expanded ed. 2003) (describing how it was during the classical era
of tort law that Holmes first “isolate[ed] . . . negligence as a comprehensive
principle of tort law”).
69. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 111, 124 (Little, Brown, and
Co. 1923) (1881).
70. Id. at 124; see also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66,
70 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (“It is true . . . that the question of due care very generally
is left to the jury. But we are dealing with a standard of conduct, and when the
standard is clear it should be laid down once for all by the Courts.”).
71. WHITE, supra note 68, at 58 (summarizing this perspective and stating
that “[i]t was not difficult for scientists to see the subversive effect of jury
determinations on the theoretical integrity of tort law”).
72. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, 1, 14–17, 229–
30 (1986) (describing the origins, growth, and development of the legal realist
movement).
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leading torts casebook explained, the focus of tort law is “not so
much with rule or doctrine as with problems in human
relations,” 73 a characterization suggesting an increased role for
the jury. 74 However, judges and scholars continued to crave
“order and coherence in the law.” 75 During the post-World War II
period, judges remained institutionally conservative and largely
preserved the rules of an earlier era that denied plaintiffs access
to juries. 76 William Prosser, probably the most influential torts
scholar of his generation, served as the reporter for the Second
Restatement of Torts and as the author of an influential treatise,
a leading casebook, and numerous articles. 77 Despite Prosser’s
post-realist recognition of the importance of policy, the core of his
work was that he “classified and simplified doctrine.” 78 In other
words, his tort scholarship helped perpetuate the rule-based
73. HARRY SCHULMAN & FLEMING JAMES, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW OF TORTS, at vii (1942).
74. Cf. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and
Personal Injury Claims, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 253, (2004) (describing “the
jury’s role as enunciator of behavioral norms”); Catherine Pierce Wells, Tort
Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88
MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2409 (1990) (concluding that “most tort verdicts
are . . . based on a consensus . . . [by] juries [that] normally include a cross
section or normative viewpoints”).
75. WHITE, supra note 68, at 91.
76. See id. at 167 (“The renewed sense among postwar legal scholars that
in a modern interdependent society even small changes in the law had the
potential to generate large and unforeseen ripples proved to be a deterrent
strong enough to hold back sweeping proposals for reform of common law
negligence.”); see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MARKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 568–69
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (1958) (listing
advantages of stare decisis as (1) helping people plan their lives based on
established law, (2) establishing “fair and efficient adjudication,” and
(3) building “public confidence in the judiciary”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to the Legal Process, in
id. at i, iii (stating that The Legal Process “provided the name, the agenda, and
much of the analytical structure for a generation of legal thoughts . . . that
became deeply entrenched . . . in the 1950s and for some time thereafter”).
77. See Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as
Biography and Intellectual History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 579–80 (describing
Prosser’s contributions as Reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as
author of a leading treatise and influential articles, and as editor of the leading
casebook).
78. WHITE, supra note 68, at 177.
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regime of tort law that Holmes had pioneered and, in the process,
Prosser enabled judges to continue to dismiss cases. 79
During the period of the late-1960s through the mid-1980s,
the dam that Holmes and Prosser had constructed broke, and
most courts began submitting far more cases to juries. 80 Judge
Guido Calabresi, one of the most influential torts theorists of this
new era, explained: “[T]he so-called Holmes view—that standards
of conduct ought increasingly to be fixed by the court for the sake
of certainty—has been largely rejected . . . . The tendency has
been away from fixed standards and towards enlarging the
sphere of the jury.” 81 However, “the tendency” described by Judge
Calabresi is manifested in some states far more than in others. 82
B. Tort Doctrines that Deny Plaintiffs Access to Juries
In the remainder of this Part, we describe five sets of rules
that have played a gate-keeping function in preventing personal
injury plaintiffs from having their cases decided by juries. 83
These examples certainly do not comprise the entire set of legal
doctrines that may prevent plaintiffs from having their cases
heard by juries. Rather, we selected them because of their
importance in denying plaintiffs access to juries and because
virtually every state has considered each of these issues and
taken a position on them. 84 At the same time, in an effort to
79. See id. (explaining how Prosser merely sought to facilitate efficiency in
the current regime, rather than actual reforms).
80. See Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1999)
(describing the “secular decline of the Holmes position” and the fact that the
New York judiciary has adopted the opposing Knowlton viewpoint).
81. Id. (quoting Nuckoles v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 372 F.2d 286, 289 (4th
Cir. 1967)).
82. See infra Part IV.B (explaining that not all states have moved to the
same extent towards providing more access to jury trials; hence the JADI
studies and their relevancy to this topic).
83. See infra Parts II.B.1–5 (identifying the five sets of rules as
(1) contributory negligence and comparative fault, (2) premises liability limited
duty rules, (3) other no-duty and limited-duty rules, (4) charitable institution
liability, and (5) scientific expert qualification standards).
84. See, e.g., infra Part II.B.1 (explaining that the doctrine of contributory
negligence as a complete bar used to be nearly universal across the fifty states,
but now is very limited after most states decided to alter their existing tort laws
on the issue).

574

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (2016)

accurately reflect the extent of jury access denial of each state’s
comprehensive tort law considered as a package, we also
attempted to identify categories of issues that affected various
tort specialties. For example, on one hand, contributory
negligence often plays an important role in denying plaintiffs
access to juries in automobile and premises slip-and-fall cases,
but far less frequently in medical malpractice cases. 85 On the
other hand, the qualifications required to qualify a scientist or
engineer to testify as an expert witness typically is critical to
whether or not the jury decides the case in the areas of products
liability and medical malpractice, but is of much less significance
in enabling cases to be considered by juries in most automobile
and premises liability cases. 86 Similarly, when we selected the
plaintiffs’ attorneys and defense counsel who assisted us in
quantifying the relative importance of the five sets of
jury-access-denial doctrines, we also considered both their
current practice specialties and their past experiences with other
types of tort cases.
1. The Choice Between Contributory Negligence and Comparative
Fault
At least until the late 1960s, virtually all jurisdictions
followed the rule that any contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff barred her action against the defendant. 87 Today,
that rule prevails in only four states and the District of
Columbia. 88 The change from contributory negligence as a total
85. See Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics
Can Tell Us About Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1205, 1222 (1994) (noting that “[a]utomobile cases may involve contributory
negligence, which is not claimed as often in malpractice cases”).
86. See id. (observing that “[m]edical malpractice lawyers tend to . . . invest
heavily in experts, whereas generalist lawyers who often call few or no experts
litigate automobile cases”); see also infra notes 129–131 and accompanying text
(explaining how judges accustomed to expert testimony on liability are quicker
to dismiss cases when the plaintiffs lack experts).
87. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.01 (5th ed.
2010) (reporting that in 1950, forty-five states followed the rule that
contributory negligence was a total bar to recovery).
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17 cmt. a,
rptrs’ note (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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bar to plaintiff’s recovery to a comparative fault standard, under
which plaintiff’s recovery is reduced but not eliminated by any
fault on the plaintiff’s part, 89 is widely acknowledged to have
been “among this generation’s most important tort law
developments.” 90
The most important consequence of the change to
comparative fault is that the jury decides far more negligence
cases. 91 Under the older rule of contributory negligence, trial
judges frequently kept cases from going to the jury by either
granting the defendant’s motion for a summary judgment before
trial, or, more often, its motion for a directed verdict at trial on
the grounds that the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent
as a matter of law and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover. 92
2. Limited Duty Rules in Premises Liability Cases
During the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, at least
three separate sets of limited-duty and no-duty rules affected the
outcomes of litigation brought by those tortiously injured while
visitors to the defendant’s premises. In some states, these
89. See Donald G. Gifford & Christopher J. Robinette, Apportioning
Liability in Maryland Tort Cases: Time to End Contributory Negligence and
Joint and Several Liability, 73 MD. L. REV. 701, 708–09 (2014) (stating that
under the pure form of comparative fault, the plaintiff’s recovery is determined
by multiplying her or his damages by the defendant’s percentage of fault; but
under modified comparative fault, a plaintiff who is more than or equally at
fault than the defendant recovers nothing).
90. Andrew R. Klein, Comparative Fault and Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 983,
983 (2006).
91. See Ellen M. Bublick, Comparative Fault to the Limits, 56 VAND. L. REV.
977, 1042 (2003) (“Comparative fault was meant to decrease the role of judges
and give more cases to the jury . . . and it undoubtedly has done so.”).
92. See Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41
ILL. L. REV. 151, 169 (1946) (describing contributory negligence as “an ingenious
device which gave the court almost complete freedom to accept or reject jury
participation at its pleasure”); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Contributory Negligence: A
Necessary Check on the American Jury, 43 A.B.A. J. 1005, 1007 (1957) (“[T]he
common-law rule of contributory negligence performs a necessary function as a
‘check and balance’ on the American jury.”); Gregory D. Smith, Contributory
Negligence as a Matter of Law: The Last Vestiges, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 674, 677–
78 (1987) (describing the decline of the once widespread practice of ruling
“contributory negligence as a matter of law”).
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doctrines that made it easier for judges to keep cases away from
the jury remain largely intact, while in other states, they have
been largely eliminated. 93
Traditionally, the first limitation on the liability of the land
possessor was that his liability depended upon whether the
plaintiff was an invitee, 94 a licensee, 95 or a trespasser. 96 Only an
invitee was owed the general standard of reasonable care under
the circumstances. 97 Courts in nineteenth-century England
originally created the limitations on the duty of care owed by land
possessors to licensees and trespassers “to disgorge the jury of
some of its power by . . . allowing the judge to take the case from
the jury.” 98 Just as courts today fear that African-American and
low-income jurors identify with victims more than they do with
businesses and other defendants, nineteenth-century courts were
concerned that “juries were comprised mainly of potential land
entrants who most likely would act to protect the community at
large and thereby rein in the landowner’s sovereign power over
his land.” 99 The trial judge was able to dismiss cases in which the
land possessor’s conduct, while arguably unreasonable, did not
satisfy the more stringent requirements of liability owed to a
93. See infra Appendix A, tbl.2 (noting the entries for each of the seventeen
states under the category of “Limited or No-Duty Rules in Premises Cases”).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(defining an invitee as someone who enters onto land either “for a purpose
directly connected with business dealings with the possessor of that land” or “as
a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the
public”).
95. See id. § 330 (defining a “licensee [as] a person who is privileged to
enter or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor’s consent” and listing
“social guests,” among others).
96. See id. § 329 (defining a trespasser as someone “who enters or remains
upon land . . . of another without . . . privilege . . . [or] consent”).
97. See FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER,
JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS § 27.12 (3d ed. 2008) (“The occupier’s duty to the invitee
is one of due care in all circumstances.”).
98. See Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 892 (N.C. 1998) (abolishing the
distinction in duty of care owed to invitees and licensees); see also Carl S.
Hawkins, Premises Liability After Repudiation of the Status Categories:
Allocation of Judge and Jury Functions, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 15, 18 (1981)
(stating that “the formal status rules . . . have kept many cases from juries”).
99. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d at 887; see also Norman S. Marsh, The History
and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 LAW Q. REV.
182, 189 (1953).
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licensee. 100 Many jurisdictions, however, shifted their positions on
this issue during the late 1960s through the mid-1980s and now
apply a general negligence standard to both invitees and
licensees, thereby making it easier for licensees to have their
cases decided by juries. 101
The second limitation on the liability of landowners under
common law was that, traditionally, a landlord, with a few
specific exceptions, was not liable to a visitor to his land who
sustained injuries while visiting the leased premises. 102 Unless
there was evidence that the injury of the visitor to the leased
premises fell into an exception, the trial judge dismissed the
case. 103 In some states, the limitation on the landlord’s liability
for an injury occurring to a visitor to the leased premises has
been reduced or eliminated. 104 As a result, visitors injured on
leased premises are more likely to have their cases decided by
juries than their counterparts in states following the traditional
rules. 105
100. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 97, §§ 27.9–27.10 (stating that
the land occupier “need not inspect the premises to discover defects or other
dangerous conditions” and detailing other ways in which the standard of care
owed is less than that of a reasonable person).
101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 51
cmt. a, rptrs’ note (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (identifying twenty-four states as having
made the change between 1965 and 1985).
102. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 97, § 27.16 (describing the
landlord’s duty under the doctrine as “very limited”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 355 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (providing that “a lessor of land is not subject
to liability to . . . others upon the land . . . for physical harm caused by any
dangerous condition which comes into existence after the lessee has taken
possession”).
103. The most important exceptions to the doctrine included situations in
which the landlord knew of concealed defects and failed to disclose them, knew
that the premises would be open to the public, failed to comply with an
agreement to repair a hazard, or where the injury occurred on common
premises. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 97, § 27.16 (noting that unless
the landlord’s actions fell into one of the noted exceptions to the open and
obvious hazard doctrine, he was generally considered not liable for any injury
incurred due to a lack of due care).
104. See id. (describing the law that traditionally provided that “the
tenant . . . was therefore traditionally considered alone liable to visitors for
injuries . . . [as] rapidly changing”).
105. See id. (stating that under the traditional rule, the tenant of leased
premises maintains exclusive possession over the property, which excuses the
landlord from liability toward injured visitors).
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The third limitation is that historically, land possessors were
not liable when visitors on land were injured by an “open and
obvious” hazard. 106 If the evidence proved that the risk was open
and obvious to the reasonable person, the court took the case
away from the jury and ruled for the defendant as a matter of
law. 107 Many courts have moved away from this position and now
hold that “the fact that a dangerous condition is open and
obvious . . . does not pretermit the land possessor’s liability.” 108
Rather, the open and obvious nature of the risk bears upon
whether the defendant exercised reasonable care, most often a
question to be decided by the jury. 109
3. Other No-Duty and Limited-Duty Rules
In innumerable factual situations other than those arising in
premises liability, courts take cases from juries by holding that
the defendant owes the plaintiff either no duty of care or a
limited duty of care. 110 They reason that judges, not juries, should
decide whether a duty is owed because the decision is one resting
on policy that “will be the same in every case” and not on
evidence regarding the facts of a particular case. 111 Courts vary
106. See id. § 27.9 (stating that land possessor “owes the licensee no duty of
precaution if the danger is perfectly obvious”).
107. See, e.g., Lorenzo v. Wirth, 49 N.E. 1010, 1011 (Mass. 1898) (ruling that
a land possessor had no duty to warn licensee of an open coal hole).
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 51
cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
109. See Broussard v. State, 113 So.3d 175, 185 (La. 2013) (“[T]he factfinder . . . determines . . . whether those risks pose an open and obvious
hazard . . . [and] whether defendant has breached a duty . . . by failing to
discover, obviate, or warn of a defect . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 51 cmt. k (requiring land possessors “to take
reasonable precautions for known or obvious dangers when the possessor
‘should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness’” and
extending the duty to all entrants except flagrant trespassers (citation
omitted)).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
§ 7(b) (“In exceptional cases . . . in a particular class of cases, a court may decide
that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care
requires modification.”).
111. See id. § 7 cmt. a (“When liability depends on factors applicable to
categories of actors or patterns of conduct, the appropriate rubric is duty.
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considerably in the extent to which they are willing to employ the
“no duty” rubric to prevent cases from reaching the jury. 112
However, the Third Restatement of Torts explicitly admonishes
courts not to use no-duty analysis excessively: “When
no . . . categorical considerations apply and reasonable minds
could differ . . . courts should not use duty and no-duty
determinations to substitute their evaluation for that of the
jury.”113
In considering the effect of no-duty rules on a state’s Jury
Access Denial Index, we examine three subsets of such rules on
which virtually all states have taken clear positions, but these
positions often conflict with one another. First, we consider
dramshop liability; that is, whether someone who sells
intoxicating beverages to a third party who then harms someone,
owes a duty of care to the victim. 114 A substantial majority of
states recognize such liability. 115 Among the states that do not
recognize liability, a few explicitly hold that no duty is owed. 116
However, most courts that hold for the defendant find as a matter
No-duty rules are appropriate only when a court can promulgate relatively
clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.”).
112. Compare, e.g., Duvall v. Goldin, 362 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that a physician owed a duty of care to a third party when
“failure to diagnose or properly treat an epileptic condition may create a risk of
harm to a third party”), with, e.g., Medina v. Hochberg, 987 N.E.2d 1206, 1213
(Mass. 2013) (holding that “a physician does not owe a duty to nonpatients to
warn his or her patients of the dangers of driving posed by a patient’s
underlying medical condition”).
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7
cmt. i (finding that “[c]ourts sometimes inaptly express this result in terms of
duty” when “reasonable minds could differ about the application of the
negligence standard to a particular category of recurring facts”).
114. See Dram Shop Civil Liability and Criminal Penalty State Statutes,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financialservices-and-commerce/dram-shop-liability-state-statutes.aspx (last updated June
14, 2013) (last visited Apr. 21, 2016) (describing dramshop liability as holding
liquor sellers “liable for selling or serving alcohol to individuals who cause
injuries or death as a result of their intoxication”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
115. See id. (listing dramshop liability statutes in thirty states); see also
infra Appendix A, tbl.2 and accompanying notes (describing the position of the
courts of each of the seventeen states surveyed in our analysis).
116. See, e.g., Warr v. JMGM Grp., LLC, 70 A.3d 347, 364 (Md. 2013)
(deciding that tavern operator owes no duty to the parent of a child killed by
patron of tavern).
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of law that the plaintiff’s harm does not lie within the scope of
risk created by the defendant’s conduct or that the defendant’s
actions were not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. 117 For
our analysis, this classic distinction does not matter; either
ground for dismissal prevents the jury from deciding the case.
The second subcategory of no-duty rules is whether a mental
health provider owes a duty of care to a person harmed by his
patient after the therapist has knowledge or should have
knowledge of the risk posed by his patient. 118 The third and final
subcategory of no-duty rules is whether a state owes a duty of
care to a person injured or killed by a probationer or parolee
when state authorities have been negligent in releasing or
supervising him. 119
4. Limitations on the Liability of Charitable Institutions
Alongside the transition from contributory negligence, the
total or partial abrogation of immunities is regarded as one of the
most important pro-plaintiff changes in tort law during the last
half of the twentieth century. 120 The abrogation of sovereign

117. See Julia A. Harden, Comment, Dramshop Liability: Should the
Intoxicated Person Recover for His Own Injuries?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 227, 230–33,
233 n.64 (1987) (listing cases from states concluding that “the proximate cause
of the injury is drinking the liquor, not selling it”).
118. Compare Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 341
(Cal. 1976) (“When a therapist determines . . . that his patient presents a
serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable
care to protect the intended victim against such danger.”), with Nasser v.
Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502, 506 (Va. 1995) (ruling that the defendant therapist had
no duty to warn murdered plaintiff of danger posed by ex-boyfriend patient who
had earlier threatened to kill plaintiff); see also infra Appendix A, tbl.2
(identifying the positions of the courts of each of the seventeen states surveyed
in our analysis).
119. Compare Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243, 257 (Wash. 1992) (concluding
that “parole officers have a duty to protect [third parties] from reasonably
foreseeable dangers engendered by parolees’ dangerous propensities”), with Fox
v. Custis, 372 S.E.2d 373, 375–76 (Va. 1974) (finding that the defendant state
parole officers owed no duty to victims of crimes committed by parolee); see also
infra Appendix A (detailing the position of the courts of each of the seventeen
states surveyed in our analysis).
120. See SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 507 (noting that “the trend
toward total or partial abrogation of . . . immunities during the latter decades of
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immunity, 121 family immunities, 122 and charitable immunities 123
enabled more injured victims to have their cases heard by the
jury. In our analysis, we focus on limitations on the traditional
immunity of charitable institutions for two reasons. First,
considerable variations exist regarding the law governing liability
of charitable institutions, thereby facilitating cross-state
comparisons. 124 Second, the liability of charitable institutions has
important real-world litigation consequences because of the
extent to which once-immune defendants such as charitable
hospitals 125 and even religious institutions 126 have now become
important targets of litigation. These changes to charitable
immunity began earlier in the twentieth century and continued
into the 1990s, but again they were concentrated during the
period of the late 1960s through the mid-1980s. 127

the twentieth century ranks among the more striking changes in twentieth
century tort law”).
121. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 8, § 261 (describing change
from total sovereign immunity to “limited immunities” for governments and
their officials; further stating that “it is now usually accepted that
government . . . should be obliged to make good on the losses it causes by
misconduct”).
122. See id. §§ 279–280 (discussing the partial or total elimination of family
immunities, including interspousal and parental immunities).
123. See id. § 282 (covering partial or total elimination of the immunities of
charitable institutions).
124. See infra Part IV.G (explaining that many states have various reasons
for differences in laws governing charitable institutions and other limiting
factors, often citing reasons such as stare decisis); see also infra Appendix A,
tbl.2.
125. See Stephen H. Price, The Sinking of the “Captain of the Ship”, 10 J.
LEGAL MED. 323, 348 (1989) (describing increasing litigation against hospitals in
the wake of the abrogation of charitable immunity).
126. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline
of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 240 (2000) (explaining that “actions
specifically against religious entities and individuals . . . appear to be on the
rise”).
127. See Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Tort Immunity of Nongovernmental
Charities—Modern Status, 25 A.L.R. 4th 517 (2005) (listing decisions abolishing
charitable immunity from forty-eight states along with their dates).
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5. Standards Governing the Qualifications of Scientific Experts
The legal standard for establishing the qualifications of
scientific experts in tort cases is often critical to the plaintiff’s
ability to have her case heard by the jury. 128 Medical and
financial experts have always been important in helping the jury
assess damages in automobile and other routine tort cases, but
during the past generation, experts have become increasingly
important in determining liability in medical malpractice, 129
products liability, 130 and toxic tort cases. 131 In such cases, if a
plaintiff lacks an expert the court deems qualified to testify
regarding causation or other prerequisites for liability, the trial
judge dismisses the case by granting either a summary judgment
before trial or a directed verdict during trial, thus preventing the
submission of the case to the jury. 132
128. See Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 754 (1998)
(stating that “especially in toxic tort cases, . . . [the] exclusion of an expert on
admissibility grounds is usually tantamount to a dismissal on insufficiency
grounds”).
129. See David E. Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant
Expert, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 158, 162 (1966) (explaining that “in an overwhelming
majority of malpractice actions expert testimony is the sine qua non of plaintiff’s
case”).
130. See generally DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 6.3 (3d ed.
2014) (describing the importance of expert testimony in proving defectiveness
and causation in products liability cases).
131. See Leslie A. Lunney, Protecting Juries from Themselves: Restricting
the Admission of Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. REV. 103, 105
(1994) (“In toxic tort cases, expert testimony plays a crucial role, because it
would be difficult for a plaintiff to satisfy his or her burden of proof regarding
causation without the specialized knowledge and opinion of an expert.”).
132. See e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.
1995), on remand from 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (affirming for a second time the
district court’s granting of “summary judgment based on its exclusion of
plaintiffs’ expert testimony”); Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. GE, 45 F.3d 135, 136
(6th Cir. 1995) (affirming “lower court’s decision to exclude portions of the
expert’s testimony [and] to direct a verdict in favor of [defendant]”); Lessard v.
Caterpillar Inc., 737 N.Y.S.2d 191 (App. Div. 2002) (holding that “[t]he court
properly granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, given the inability of
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of design defect in the absence of expert
testimony”); Michael A. Haskel, A Proposal for Addressing the Effects of
Hindsight and Positive Outcome Biases in Medical Malpractice Cases, 42 TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 895, 912 (2007) (stating that “if proffered expert
testimony being relied upon by the plaintiff to establish a prima face case is
excluded . . . , the plaintiff would be unable to defeat a motion for summary
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To determine how restrictive states are in qualifying
scientific experts to testify in tort cases, we measured the extent
to which states adopted holdings in the 1990s that made it more
difficult to qualify scientific experts as a response to a perceived
lack of rigor in screening experts during the 1970s and the
1980s. 133 In 1975, the standard for the admissibility of expert
testimony in the federal courts moved in a decidedly pro-plaintiff
direction with the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 134
Most states soon adopted similar rules. 135 Many trial court judges
saw the new rules as an invitation to allow virtually any
self-described expert to testify. 136
Reacting against a perceived onslaught of “junk science,” 137
in 1992 the U.S. Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 138 interpreted the new federal rule. The Court
called upon federal judges to assume “a gatekeeping
role . . . [that] on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of

judgment brought by the defendant”); Georgene M. Vairo, “Through the Prism:
Summary Judgment After the Triology,” ALI-ABA Course Materials: Civil
Practice and Litigation Techniques in Federal and State Courts (2005)
(describing how the tighter standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence
after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert “often leads to the approval of a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment”).
133. See infra Part II.A.5 (discussing how holdings like Daubert greatly
restricted the admissibility of expert witnesses).
134. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (explaining that expert opinions are admissible as
long as they meet four qualitative criteria).
135. See Heather G. Hamilton, Note, The Movement From Frye to Daubert:
Where Do the States Stand?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 209 (1998) (“As of January
1, 1995, only seven states had not adopted Rule 702.”).
136. See, e.g., Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 642, 644 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting) (criticizing the growing prevalence of expert
witnesses for fields of knowledge that do not require expert testimony and their
unreliable testimony).
137. See OWEN, supra note 130, § 6.3 (describing how during the 1970s and
1980s, “courts and commentators . . . increasingly decried a perceived growth in
abuses of expert testimony—of ‘junk science’ run amok”); see also DEPT. OF JUST.,
REP. OF THE TORT POL’Y WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT & POL’Y
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INS. AVAILABILITY & AFFORDABILITY 35
(1986) (indicating that “noncredible scientific or medical testimony, studies or
opinions . . . commonly referred to as ‘junk science’ . . . has led to a deep and
growing cynicism about the ability of tort law to deal with difficult scientific and
medical concepts in a principled and rational way”).
138. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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authentic insights and innovations.” 139 Federal trial judges were
told to “make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and . . . can be applied to the facts in issue.” 140 In making these
determinations, courts were to consider whether the expert’s
theory or technique had been tested, the reliability of a procedure
and its potential rate of error, whether the technique had been
subjected to peer evaluation and published, and whether it was
generally accepted in the scientific community. 141
A majority of states proceeded to adopt the Daubert standard
for the admissibility of expert testimony or some variant of it,
while a minority continued to follow 142 some variant of the
standard established in Frye v. United States. 143 The Frye test for
admissibility is whether a newly developed form of science or
technology is “sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” 144
Despite hints in the Daubert opinion itself that the Supreme
Court intended to liberalize the admission of scientific
testimony, 145 by 2005, Professors Edward Cheng and Albert Yoon
concluded that in the federal courts:

139. Id. at 597.
140. Id. at 592–93.
141. See id. at 593–94 (noting that the Court did not “presume to set out a
definitive checklist or test”). In its subsequent opinion in General Electric Co. v.
Joiner, the Court further strengthened the trial court’s gate-keeping function
when it held that appellate courts would review trial court decisions only under
the comparatively lax “abuse of discretion” standard. See 522 U.S. 136, 145
(1997) (“We hold, therefore, that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by
which to review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude scientific
evidence.”).
142. See OWEN, supra note 130, at n.82 (“As of 2002, roughly fifteen states
still purport to follow Frye.”).
143. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923).
144. Id. at 1014.
145. The Court described Frye as establishing an “austere standard” and
emphasized that its new standard was “a flexible one.” Id. at 594. It also
emphasized that “‘[g]eneral acceptance’ is not a necessary precondition to the
admissibility of scientific evidence.” Id. at 597; see also Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142
(following Daubert and observing that “the Federal Rules of Evidence allow
district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than
would have been admissible under Frye”).
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Daubert has become a potent weapon of tort reform by causing
judges to scrutinize scientific evidence more closely. . . . The
resulting effects of Daubert have been decidedly prodefendant. In the civil context, Daubert has empowered
defendants to exclude certain types of scientific evidence,
substantially improving their chances of obtaining summary
judgment and thereby avoiding what are perceived to be
unpredictable and often plaintiff-friendly juries. 146

Most other observers agree that Daubert is more restrictive than
Frye in allowing an expert’s testimony to be heard by the jury. 147
In other words, the adoption of the Daubert standard by most
state courts in the early 1990s is yet another means of denying
plaintiffs access to juries.
In Table 2 in Appendix A, we briefly identify each of the
seventeen states’ respective positions on the issues described in
this Subpart. 148

146. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A
Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 472–73 (2005)
(footnote omitted). However, the authors attempted to indirectly “measure the
effect of Frye versus Daubert” by comparing the rates at which tort defendants
sought to remove their cases from New York courts (continuing to follow Frye) to
federal courts (following Daubert) with the rates that similar defendants in
Connecticut (following Daubert) removed to federal courts. Id. at 482, 485. They
found “that a state’s choice of scientific admissibility standard does not have a
statistically significant effect on removal rates.” Id. at 503. They concluded that
“[t]his finding may support the broader theory that a state’s adoption of Frye or
Daubert makes no difference in practice.” Id.
147. Professor Lucinda Finley writes:
Those who predicted that trial judges would flex their gatekeeper
muscles to exclude vast quantities of plaintiffs’ proposed expert
causation opinion testimony in products liability cases have turned
out to be right. The post-Daubert era can fairly be described as the
period of “strict scrutiny” of science by non-scientifically trained
judges.
Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are
Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 341 (2000); see also, e.g., Joseph Sanders, Shari S. Diamond
& Neil Vidmar, Legal Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL’Y & L. 139, 141 n.13 (2002) (concluding that “in practice the Daubert
test has been more restrictive than Frye”).
148. Infra Appendix A, tbl.2.
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III. Possible Explanations for Variations in Tort Law Affecting
Jury Access
In this Part, we discuss the factors that we identify as the
ones most likely to affect the extent to which a state continues to
follow the substantive law doctrines that once denied personal
injury plaintiffs access to the jury in almost all jurisdictions but
continue to be followed in only a minority of states. In Part IV, we
empirically test whether there is a correlation between any of
these variables and the extent to which a state continues to
employ these jury-access-denial doctrines. 149
In Subpart A of this Part, we discuss whether perceptions
among
judges
and
legislators
that
predominantly
African-American and low-income urban juries will be biased in
favor of personal injury plaintiffs results in policymakers
adopting doctrines that deny plaintiffs access to juries. 150 In
Subpart B, we consider whether a state’s history as part of the
South affects the extent to which it has adopted changes to its
substantive law that have helped personal injury plaintiffs to
have their cases decided by the jury. 151 We initially examined this
factor because we recognized that tort law in the South more
often appears to impede the plaintiff’s access to the jury than
does the substantive law in other states. 152 As but one example,
we noted that all five jurisdictions that retain contributory
negligence as a total bar to the plaintiff’s recovery lie below the
Mason–Dixon Line. 153 Finally, in Subpart C, we consider a
possible alternative explanation for why some states continue to
follow anti-jury doctrines more than others, namely, that
politically liberal states might be expected to be more flexible in
149. Infra Part IV.
150. Because previous research on the effects of these two separate and
distinct variables often considers them together, we consider both race and
income inequality in Part A. However, our own empirical testing considers each
individually, see infra Part IV.C (income inequality) & Part IV.D (race), before
testing for interactions among the variables. Infra Part IV.F.
151. Infra Part III.B.
152. Infra Appendix A, tbl.1.
153. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 8, § 220 (noting that
Alabama, the District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia are
the last remaining jurisdictions to retain contributory negligence); see also infra
Appendix A, tbl.2 (listing the JADI assessments).
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allowing personal injury plaintiffs to have their cases decided by
juries. 154
We recognize that in any particular state, idiosyncratic
factors, such as the presence of an unusually effective tort reform
lobbyist, can affect the extent to which that state denies jury
access. 155 Moreover, while we cannot exclude the possibility of
correlations with other variables for which we do not test, 156 our
review of the existing literature, as well as our own
154. Infra Part III.C.
155. Shortly after William Prosser advocated for a comparative negligence
bill in the California legislature in 1953, in a letter to his mother he described
the efforts of insurance and industry lobbyists that caused the bill to fail:
The association [the California State Bar Association] was quite
confident that it would get the bill through. There were eleven votes
on the senate committee, and they thought they had seven of them
nailed down, with hopes of an eighth. In the meantime, however, a
defendants’ lobby, manned and financed by the liability insurance
companies and the railroads, had moved in to kill the bill. I was told
by one friendly member of the assembly committee that it was the
heaviest drive that any lobby had put on in the last four years, with
more money spent on entertaining the members of the committees
and the like, than anyone remembered for quite a while. In addition
there were phone calls and telegrams from people over the state,
mostly good clients of the legislators—the bill came before the
judiciary committee, all of whom are lawyers. The result was that the
vote went 6 to 5 against the bill in the senate committee. . . . It is
licked for this session. I am getting pretty well acquainted with the
committees, and also getting a liberal education on how we are
governed.
Letter from William L. Prosser to Zerelda Ann Huckeby Prosser (May 3, 1953)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). We express our thanks to
Professor Christopher J. Robinette for providing us with access to the letter. See
also Gifford & Robinette, supra note 89, at 702 (describing efforts of lobbyists
representing business and insurance interests to prevent enactment of
comparative fault legislation).
156. A few of the variables that might be tested for correlation with a state’s
Jury Access Denial Index include (a) the rate of unionization between 1965 and
1985; (b) the prevalence of various types of businesses within a state;
(c) whether appellate judges are elected or appointed; and (d) the percentage of
African-American voters disenfranchised in 1965. We considered studying a
correlation between the date when an African-American justice joined each
state’s supreme court and the state’s JADI. However, a quick perusal of data
suggested no association. See First Black Judges on the State Supreme Courts,
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/First_black_judges_on_the_state_supreme_
courts (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (providing a history of African-American judges
on state supreme courts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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understanding of tort law, informed the selection of the variables
we tested.
A. Race and Income Inequality: The Perception that “Bronx
Juries” Redistribute Wealth
1. The Legal Community’s Perceptions of African-American and
Low-Income Jurors
Judges and lawyers typically believe that the racial and
socio-economic composition of the jury affects trial outcomes. 157
That being the case, we hypothesize that judges and legislators of
states where the leading and most visible legal centers include a
high percentage of African-American or low-income jurors may
continue to follow the traditional tort doctrines that impede the
ability of tort plaintiffs to have their cases “reach” (be considered
by) juries. It is the widely held perceptions among judges and
legislators regarding the decision-making of African-American
and low-income jurors—and not actual differences between trial
outcomes at the hands of disproportionately poor and
African-American urban juries and those elsewhere—that lead to
more restrictions on jury access.
Professors Marvin Zalman and Olga Tsoudis interviewed
seventy-nine attorneys following trials in which they participated
regarding what juror characteristics they looked for during the
voir dire process. 158 They found that the attorneys believed “that
blacks are more sympathetic to civil plaintiffs because they are
more often subject to unfairness.” 159 One plaintiff’s attorney
acknowledged his biases during voir dire: “‘Do I look at race?—
yes—absolutely. . . . Women and blacks—those people have been

157. See, e.g., infra note 160 and accompanying text (reporting a study that
found that attorneys have attempted to structure the jury to include jurors who
have traditionally been discriminated against).
158. See Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden:
Lawyers Speak About Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 187–88 (2005) (noting
that the questions asked were both “narrowly focused and open ended”).
159. Id. at 304.
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hammered all their lives.’” 160 Another study found that defense
attorneys use peremptory challenges to exclude twice as many
potential black jurors as do plaintiffs’ attorneys. 161
The intuition that African-American and poor jurors will
favor plaintiffs when they decide the issue of liability and when
they assess damages is a logical one given the experiences of
dispossessed groups in American society. Frank McClellan, an
African-American scholar and plaintiff’s attorney, writes that
“[e]xpressing their perceptions of justice through awards in
serious personal injury cases is one of the few opportunities that
most people of color have to . . . send a message to corporations
and other powerful social players.” 162 In a similar vein, Eric
Helland and Alexander Tabarrok conclude their analysis of the
effects of race and poverty on damages awards by hypothesizing:
“Given the different life experiences of poor black and Hispanic
jury members, . . . the decisions of such jurors about
justice . . . could differ significantly from those of other jurors.” 163
From one perspective, the distinctive predilections of
African-American and low-income jurors as they approach the
liability issue can be seen as a concrete and legitimate
manifestation of the jury’s role in reflecting community values. 164
From the other perspective, corporate officials and defense

160. Id. Another plaintiff’s attorney participating in the study observed that
“African-Americans . . . are more generous in damage awards. They tend to
support the underdog.” Id.
161. See John Clark et al., Five Factor Model Personality Traits, Jury
Selection, and Case Outcomes in Criminal and Civil Cases, 34 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 641, 647 tbl.1 (2007) (finding that 24% of the jurors excused by defense
attorneys in civil cases were African-American, compared with 12% of the jurors
excused by plaintiffs’ attorneys). For more on the use of peremptory challenges
to exclude African-American jurors specifically in the South, see infra notes
220−228 and accompanying text.
162. McClellan, supra note 2, at 785.
163. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, and American Tort
Awards: Evidence in Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 52 (2003).
164. See Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY
L.J. 1331, 1382 (2012) (characterizing the jury award as “a way that the
community sends a message about how bad the wrong or injury is” and opining
that “this is an important part of helping constitute a community—meting out
justice . . . [as] a way of articulating a community’s values”).
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counsel fear that African-American and low-income jurors may
seek to retaliate for past or present grievances. 165
Judges and legislators also fear that urban juries containing
significant numbers of African-American and low-income jurors
are predisposed to render larger damage awards. Professor
McClellan describes the urban jury as a rare opportunity for
dispossessed jurors “to make an immediate economic impact in
favor of an injured member of the community.” 166 A New York
defense attorney put it more pejoratively when he stated that
“‘[t]he Bronx civil jury is the greatest tool of wealth redistribution
since the Red Army.’” 167 In fact, the evidence regarding whether
juries with greater numbers of African-Americans and the poor
award higher damages than their whiter and more affluent
counterparts is inconclusive. 168 At the same time, however, many
judges and legislators assume that the stronger sensitivity of
African-American and low-income jurors to injustice and their
often less-than-positive encounters with businesses and
professionals lead them to award higher damages to personal
injury victims, regardless of the victim’s race or socioeconomic
status. 169
2. Comparing the Impact of Race on Welfare Reform
It does not appear that any scholar has previously examined
the impact that the racial attitudes of judges or legislators have
on the development of tort law, or even whether there is an
association between racial demographics and the substance of a
165. See, e.g., id. at 1340 (discussing the civil jury’s role as a check on
corporate and government power).
166. McClellan, supra note 2, at 785.
167. Noeleen Walder, Strauss-Kahn Accuser May Sue in Friendly Bronx,
REUTERS
(Aug.
4,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/04/usstrausskahn-civilsuit-bronx-idUSTRE77379D20110804 (last visited Mar. 7,
2016) (on file with the Washington and lee Law Review).
168. See infra notes 184–185 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of
a population’s racial composition on a plaintiff’s success).
169. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, What’s It Worth? Jury Damage Awards as
Community Judgments, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 955 (2014) (arguing that
corporations should be held to higher levels of responsibility than individuals
and should thus be required to pay a greater amount of damages).
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state’s tort law. 170 However, during the era when most states
moved toward greater jury access for injured plaintiffs, scholars
and courts frequently saw victim compensation or loss
distribution as a central goal of tort law. 171 As such, tort law was
increasingly seen as a close cousin of other more traditional forms
of state welfare. 172 Tort law compensated one particular group of
those in need, victims of tortious conduct; at the same time, the
states’ social welfare programs financially assisted other
residents in need, including victims of injury and disease,
disability, or old age. 173
Even though many tort scholars now believe that the
justification for the tort system lies in achieving goals of

170. A handful of studies consider the impact of race on individual tort
cases. See, e.g., AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY
POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 29, 30 fig.3.2 (1985) (listing,
by race, awards for plaintiffs and penalties against defendants). Professor
McClellan has speculated on the ways in which race affects tort cases. See
McClellan, supra note 2, at 772 (hypothesizing “that the race problem impacts
on every aspect of a tort claim”). He recognizes the importance of the allocation
of power between judges and juries: “Enhancing the power of the judiciary in
tort cases and minimizing the power of the jury represent a tremendous shift in
political power, a shift which should not be taken lightly.” Id. at 790. Ultimately,
Professor McClellan calls for the kind of empirical analysis that we present:
“One issue which warrants study is whether people of color will be adversely
affected if tort reform allocates more power to judges and less power to juries. In
communities that are racially diverse, the answer is most likely yes.” Id. at 792.
171. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 27–28 (1970) (describing the importance of spreading
accident losses and shifting them to “deep pockets” as a means of reducing “the
real societal costs of accidents”).
172. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 725–26 (2003) (observing
that “[t]he tort and social welfare systems both serve to protect people from
harm through the provision of financial payments after a harm has occurred”
and noting that “in the context of mass tort litigation, the tort system
increasingly draws on social welfare principles”); Donald G. Gifford, The Death
of Causation: Mass Products Torts’ Incomplete Incorporation of Social Welfare
Principles, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 952–81 (2006) (tracing the origins of
the loss distribution objective in American tort law to workers’ compensation
legislation and even further back to German and English social welfare
legislation).
173. See Gifford, supra note 172, at 951 (noting that the United States did
not enact welfare systems comparable to those of Germany and England until
the 1930s).
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“corrective justice” or “civil recourse,” 174 critics continue to
characterize it as a means of loss distribution. For example, when
later-President George W. Bush ran for Governor of Texas in
1994, his “four-issue strategy” included both welfare reform and
tort reform. 175 As Professor Philip G. Peters, Jr. observed, for
voters “seeking to reinvigorate ‘traditional’ social values, . . . tort
reform may closely resemble welfare reform, each ending an era
of unearned giveaways.” 176
Insofar as the tort system is viewed as a parallel to a state’s
social welfare policy, as it often was during the last decades of the
twentieth century, extensive research by social scientists on how
a state’s racial demographics affected its welfare reform
initiatives during that period 177 may shed light on how those
demographics impacted the development of tort law during the
same period of time. The research finds that states with higher
percentages of African-Americans on government assistance offer
lower benefits than other states, even when the analysis is
controlled for other economic and demographic factors, 178 as well

174. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and
Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1138 (2007) (characterizing tort law as “a
law of wrongs and redress”).
175. See Anne E. Kornblut, Revisiting ’00 Part of Strategy for Bush in ’04,
BOS. GLOBE (May 23, 2004), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004
/05/23/revisiting_00_part_of_strategy_for_bush_in_04/?page=ful (last visited
Feb. 16, 2016) (noting that the other two issues were education and crime
reform) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
176. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1485–86
(2007).
177. See generally RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM (Sanford F.
Schram, Joe Soss & Richard C. Fording eds., 2003) (collecting studies discussing
the relationship between race and welfare reform).
178. See, e.g., Richard C. Fording, “Laboratories of Democracy” or Symbolic
Politics?: The Racial Origins of Welfare Reform, in RACE AND THE POLITICS OF
WELFARE REFORM, supra note 177, at 78, 93 (reporting that “race is an
important factor in welfare policy-making” and that “the percentage of the
AFDC caseload that is black proves to be the strongest and most consistent
predictor of the adoption of work requirements, time limits, and state efforts to
regulate ‘irresponsible’ behavior” (emphasis in the original)); Harrell R. Rodgers,
Jr. & Kent L. Tedin, State TANF Spending: Predictors of State Tax Effort to
Support Welfare Reform, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 745, 758 (2006) (“[O]ur analysis
reveals that states with larger black populations tend to keep [welfare] spending
low.”).
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as for ideological and partisan variables. 179 Other studies have
found that the larger the percentage of African-Americans in a
state’s population, the smaller the welfare benefits. 180
Dr. Martin Johnson attributes the impact of racial
demographics on welfare reform to the threat posed by
African-Americans to the power structure controlled by the white
population:
In the contemporary South . . . larger minority populations
appear to be associated with antiminority hostility and less
desirable policies for those minorities, such as stricter voter
registration laws. Further, these feelings of threat appear to
be exacerbated by economics: as economic conditions in a
community worsen, members of the racial or ethnic majority
grow less supportive or tolerant of the minority due to their
financial insecurity. 181

179. See, e.g., Robert D. Brown, Party Cleavages and Welfare Effort in the
American States, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23, 30 (1995) (noting that “[a]s the black
portion of the state population increases, welfare effort is diminished” even
when controlling for “party elite liberalism and the nature of party cleavages”);
Christopher Howard, The American Welfare State, or States?, 52 POL. RES. Q.
421, 437 (1999) (noting that Democratic Party strength did not have an effect on
AFDC benefits).
180. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA,
AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 176 (1999) (finding that studies “that
have included some measure of the racial mix of a state’s poverty population
have consistently found race to be a significant influence on state-level AFDC
policy”); Martin Johnson, Racial Context, Public Attitudes, and Welfare Effort in
the American States, in RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM, supra note
177, at 161 (“A one-standard-deviation increase in a state’s African American
population is associated with a decrease in welfare spending by about one-fifth
of a standard deviation.”); Brown, supra note 179, at 30 (noting that “[a]s the
black portion of the state population increases, welfare effort is diminished”);
Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Racism and Welfare Policy in America, 57 SOC. SCI. Q.
718, 726 tbl.3 (1977) (“For the hypothesis concerning the effects of racial
variables we find supporting evidence with high negative correlations of AFDC
payments with percent black . . . .”).
181. See also Johnson, supra note 180, at 153 (“[T]he total effect of increased
diversity on racial attitudes is a reduction of support among whites for racial
integration, consistent with the group threat hypothesis.”); James M. Glaser,
Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the
South, 56 J. POL. 21, 40 (1994) (concluding that “[r]esistance to racial
change . . . is a response to the possibility that whites stand to lose something
valued to blacks”); Ryan D. King & Darren Wheelock, Group Threat and Social
Control: Race, Perceptions of Minorities and the Desire to Punish, 85 SOC.
FORCES 1255, 1274 (2007) (concluding that “perceptions of African Americans as
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This “group threat” hypothesis possibly has even stronger
implications for how whites perceive the presence of large
numbers of African-Americans within the population from which
members of juries are drawn in civil cases. The substantial
presence of African-American jurors, believed to be more prone to
redistribute wealth in cases in which the resources of businesses
or insurance companies are at stake, poses what they believe to
be a genuine threat to the economic well-being of the power
structure.
3. The Actual Impact of African-American and Low-Income
Jurors
In spite of the widely held beliefs that low-income and
African-American urban juries reach different decisions from
juries in suburban and rural areas, the evidence is far less
conclusive than most practitioners, judges, legislators, and
members of the public believe. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Professor
of law and sociology at Yale, found no statistically significant
correlation between the chance of prevailing on the liability issue
and any of the following three variables: the income inequality of
the local population from which the jury is drawn, the percentage
of the population living below the poverty line, and the
percentage of persons of color. 182 However, her study showed that
threatening to economic resources [is] a salient predictor that helps explain why
demographic change influences punitive beliefs”).
182. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Community Characteristics and Tort Law:
The Importance of County Demographic Composition and Inequality to Tort
Trial Outcomes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 413, 435 (2011) (discussing data
showing the effects of various racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic statuses in the
makeup of juries); see also Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments
About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase
Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 306 (1999) (finding that jurors of color are
more likely to find for the plaintiff than white jurors, but cautioning that the
variables of race, education, and income are significantly inter-correlated). But
see Brian H. Bornstein & Michelle Rajki, Extra-Legal Factors and Product
Liability: The Influence of Mock Jurors’ Demographic Characteristics and
Intuitions About the Cause of an Injury, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 127, 143 (1994)
(finding that minority mock jurors were significantly more likely to favor
plaintiffs in a product liability case than white jurors); Theodore Eisenberg &
Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and Demographics: Is There a Bronx Effect?, 80
TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1853 (2002) (finding that higher county poverty rates were

KEEPING CASES FROM BLACK JURIES

595

a county’s poverty rate and level of income inequality are
associated with the amounts of damage awards, but that the
racial composition of the local population is not. 183
Other studies find that the racial compositions of populations
from which juries are drawn correlate with neither a greater
likelihood of the plaintiff prevailing nor larger damage awards.
As Theodore Eisenberg and Martin Wells bluntly concluded: “In
tort cases, jury trial awards and plaintiff success rates do not
consistently increase significantly with black population
percentage.” 184 Interestingly, however, Helland and Tabarrok
found that race and poverty interact synergistically to increase
the size of jury awards: “Awards increase dramatically with black
poverty rates.” 185
Our objective is not to choose sides in this debate, mostly
between judges and practitioners on one side and scholars on the
other, 186 as to whether the racial or socioeconomic characteristics
correlated with increased likelihood of liability verdicts in tort claims in state
courts, but not in federal courts); Mary R. Rose & Neil Vidmar, The Bronx
“Bronx Jury”: A Profile of Civil Jury Awards in New York Counties, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1889, 1896 (2002) (showing that plaintiffs had a greater chance of success
in product liability and medical malpractice cases in Bronx County than in more
affluent adjoining New York state counties).
183. Compare Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 182, at 435 (noting that
“neither blacks nor Hispanic population rates emerge as statistically significant
predictors of the level of damages awarded to a plaintiff”), with Helland &
Tabarrok, supra note 163, at 34 (finding that “[t]he data show[ed] a marked
increase in award by poverty rate”); see also Geressy v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 980 F.
Supp. 640, 656–57 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Weinstein, J.) (noting that “‘[i]t is curious
that awards for pain and suffering on one side of the East River are uniformly
two and three times higher than on the other’” (quoting Baumgarten v. Slavin,
No. 9018/84, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 6, 1997))), aff’d in part sub nom.
Madden v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 152 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1998).
184. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 182, at 1869; see also Diamond et al.,
supra note 182, at 303–06 (concluding that the correlation between race and
verdict is inconclusive because of interactions with education and income levels).
But cf. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 182, at 1843 (reporting that “[a]ccurately
or inaccurately, rightly or wrongly, lawyers rely on stereotypical views about
jurors and counties in assessing cases and the reactions of prospective juries”).
185. See Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 163, at 46, 52 (“[A]
1-percentage-point increase in black poverty rates increases awards by
approximately 3–10 percent on average . . . . [F]orum shopping or careful voir
dire could raise awards by 30–100 percent . . . . [Awards] also appear to increase
with Hispanic poverty rates . . . .”).
186. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1126 (1992) (“It is helpful
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of the juror population affect trial outcomes. Instead, our
hypothesis is that the perceptions of judges and legislators that
juries with higher percentages of African-American or low-income
jurors in a state’s largest cities will lead them to continue to
follow traditional tort doctrines that keep plaintiffs from reaching
juries.
B. Keeping Cases from African-American Juries in the Post-Civil
Rights-Era South: The Impact of Regional History
Twenty-first century social scientists acknowledge “the
ongoing distinctiveness of the South . . . even as the economic and
cultural integration of the region has eroded many of these
differences.” 187 We define “the South” as that part of the country
where slaveholding was legal and prevalent in 1860 and where de
jure segregation was frequently practiced at least until the
1950s. 188 The traditional role of race in Southern life plays a
primary part in this distinctiveness, 189 but does not totally
explain the differences.
to separate two sources of opinions about differences between judge and jury
trials. Lay and professional perceptions about jury behavior are one source.
Recent insights of scholars supply the other.”).
187. Dan T. Carter, More Than Race: Conservatism in the White South Since
V.O. Key Jr., in UNLOCKING V.O. KEY JR.: “SOUTHERN POLITICS” FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 129, 149 (Angie Maxwell & Todd G. Shields eds., 2011); see also
EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE SOUTH vii (1987)
(“Although the South has experienced tremendous change in recent decades, it
remains the most distinctive American region.”).
188. The states that we regard as part of the South are identical to those
identified by a leading book covering the history of the South during the last
century. Preface to THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ix (Craig S.
Pascoe, Karen Trahan Leathem & Andy Ambrose eds., 2005). Dr. Pascoe and his
co-editors reason:
For the purpose of visualizing the South as a distinct region, the
editors . . . consider the eleven states that seceded from the Union—
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Other
border or nearby states, such as Missouri, Kentucky, Oklahoma,
Maryland, and West Virginia, should also be included insofar as they
are affected by the [same] specific forces and shaping influences . . . .
Id. at xiv.
189. See infra notes 207−238 and accompanying text (analyzing the racial
differences between juries in Northern and Southern states historically).
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1. Regional Differences in Mid-Nineteenth Century Common Law
The South’s distinctive development of the common law
governing personal injuries began as early as the mid-nineteenth
century, a time when the South’s racial caste system played a
dominant role in structuring the law. According to Professor
Howard Schweber, Northern judges during this period threw out
the highly specific categories and rules embedded in the
property-based English writ system and replaced them with
broadly stated negligence principles more favorable to the
development of railroad technology. 190 During the same period,
argues Professor Schweber, Southern courts were not yet
confronting the new wave of injuries caused by railroads. 191
Instead, their common law continued for several decades to focus
on specific rights and obligations arising from the classification of
different groups of people, which was designed to perpetuate the
slaveholding and largely agrarian economy. 192 Professor
Schweber concludes that even by the 1870s, when Southern
courts began to adopt general negligence principles from their
Northern counterparts, “[t]he fundamental ideological elements
of antebellum southern legal thought remained the same,”
including “preservation of . . . traditional English common law
categories.” 193 Because the common law is based on precedent,
these mid-nineteenth century differences between the North and
South, with their origins in the South’s slaveholding plantation
economy, may still affect the extent to which a state’s common

190. See HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE CREATION OF AMERICAN COMMON LAW,
1850–1880: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CITIZENSHIP 80,
146 (2004) (arguing that the changes in the common law “signaled the complete
jettisoning of the old, property rights-based analysis of duties” and that “[the
new common law of the North] was . . . defined in terms of a common duty to
further technological progress”); see also generally id. at 63–146 (covering cases
involving property damage and injuries to persons, and providing a comparison
to Northern states).
191. See id. at 147, 157–59 (observing that “Virginia was dominated by an
established set of interests opposed to the transformative power or railroad
expansion” and describing the comparatively slow development of railroads in
the state).
192. See id. at 147–258 (discussing, among other topics, an in-depth
coverage of Virginia history).
193. Id. at 204.
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law is rule-based. Specific, rather than general, legal rules 194 are
more likely to operate in the South today, thus making it more
difficult for a plaintiff to have her case decided by a jury in the
South than elsewhere in the country.
2. The Emergence of Pro-Business Southern Politics
In his classic 1950 analysis of the political structure of the
South, V.O. Key, Jr. contended that the South was dominated by
conservative white elites in areas where African-Americans
represented a substantial portion of the population. 195 These
elites feared a coalition of African-Americans, who constituted a
majority in many “black belt” 196 areas of the South, and less
affluent whites who had been heavily influenced by populism and
were perceived as a threat by large property owners. 197 To
maintain political control, these elite property owners
exacerbated racial tensions among whites fearful of black rule in
order to divide those who otherwise might be allied by populist
economic interests. 198
194. See supra notes 93−118 and accompanying text (identifying no-duty
and limited duty rules); see also Appendix A, tbl.2 and accompanying notes
(cataloging the often continuing acceptance of these doctrines by Southern
states).
195. See V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 5–6 (1950)
(noting that whites preferentially shaped Southern politics to maintain their
rule in “black belts”).
196. See id. at 5 (describing “the southern black belts” as “those counties and
sections of the southern states where [African-Americans] constitute a
substantial proportion of the population”).
197. See id. at 6 (noting that black belt whites clashed with the populist
uprisings of the 1890s); see also GERALD H. GAITHER, BLACKS AND THE POPULIST
MOVEMENT: BALLOTS AND BIGOTRY IN THE NEW SOUTH (rev. ed. 2005) (describing
how “[t]he racial prejudices of the poor whites were courted . . . to divest them of
any thought of organizing around any ideology except white supremacy. Race
was expected to be a stronger deterrent than any proposed class coalition based
on economics”).
198. See KEY, supra note 195, at 8 (“Everywhere the plantation counties
were most intense in their opposition to Negro voting; they raised a deafening
hue and cry about the dangers to white supremacy implicit in a Negro balance of
power.”); see also id. at 652, 655 (contending that in areas that were majority
African-American, “whites feared the possibility of Negro control of city, county,
and other local governments”).
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During the first half of the twentieth century, the largely
agrarian property owners in these black belt areas found that
their economic interests overlapped with those of the business
community. 199 By the 1960s, the South began to vigorously
recruit businesses from other parts of the country, 200 and the
owners and managers of the newly relocated businesses found
economic and political allies in the preexisting Southern
aristocracy. 201 Further, middle-class white voters, often driven by
conservative religious beliefs 202 or by their perceptions that
liberal Democrats favored doing too much for African-Americans,
enthusiastically joined this conservative coalition. 203 As a result,
the once solid Democratic South now favors the Republican
199. See id. at 553 (finding that as early as the 1890s, “[t]he planter found
new allies in the growing industrial and financial classes”); GAITHER, supra note
197, at 181 (describing how “[a]s a result of . . . racial cleavages developed or
exacerbated . . . [in Louisiana], blacks and not the Bourbons had become the
common enemy”).
200. See David L. Carlton, Smokestack-Chasing and Its Discontents:
Southern Development Strategy in the Twentieth Century, in THE AMERICAN
SOUTH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 188, at 122 (“The strategy of
‘smokestack chasing’—drawing in outside entrepreneurs . . . has done much to
transform the region, especially in the years since World War II.”).
201. See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 187, at 48, 314 (finding that “[a]s the
twentieth century has proceeded, state power structures have been augmented
by new producers of wealth emerging from industrialization” and “the mass
base of many southern Republican parties consist of transplanted Yankees and
Midwesterners”).
202. See id. at 213 (observing that “[i]ndividual responsibility is a major
theme in southern Protestant culture . . . one that few natives could have
escaped in childhood” and “‘Ask God for help in your work,’ goes a Protestant
prayer, but ‘do not ask Him to do it for you’”).
203. See Larry M. Bartels, What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with
Kansas?, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 201, 211 (2006) (reviewing THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE
MATTER WITH KANSAS? (2000)) (“The overall decline in Democratic support
among voters in [the] white working class over the past half-century is entirely
attributable to the demise of the Solid South as a bastion of Democratic
allegiance.”). Bartels also argues that “dramatic action on civil rights issues by
national Democratic leaders in the early 1960s precipitated a momentous
electoral shift among white southerners, eventually replacing [a] . . . Democratic
majority with a . . . Republican majority.” Id.; see also Alexander P. Lamis, The
Emergence of a Two-Party System, in THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY, supra note 188, at 225, 229 (explaining that because integrationist
efforts by Democratic leaders led to the collapse of the one-party Democratic
South, “[t]he Republican Party’s growth was propelled in these early years
by . . . white southern resentment against the Kennedy-Johnson-Humphrey
national Democratic integrationists”).
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Party. 204 This new coalition that emerged simultaneously with
the transformation of tort law elsewhere in the country is
committed to checking pro-plaintiff judges inclined to allow juries
to hear cases against businesses and insured defendants. 205
3. The Long History of Racial Exclusion from Southern Juries
Most obviously, the South’s distinctive racial history
contributed to its greater fear of juries with substantial numbers
of African-American jurors. It was during the period between the
mid-1960s and the mid-1980s that Southern business and
political leaders, for the first time since Reconstruction, had
reason to fear the impact of juries including substantial
African-American representation. 206
The fact that Southern white leaders worried about how
African-Americans would act as jurors is best corroborated by
their century-long efforts to keep African-Americans from
participating as jurors. While it is true that African-Americans
also were underrepresented in juries in Northern states, 207 efforts
to exclude them from juries in the South appear to have been
more harsh, widespread, and sustained. In the immediate
aftermath of the Civil War, integrated juries became a “common
sight” in a number of Southern states, 208 and in 1879, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a West Virginia statute that excluded
204. See generally Lamis, supra note 203 (“The second factor propelling the
Republican Party in the South revolved around conservative economic issues
tied to a restrictive view of the role of government . . . [and] it was now possible
for southern conservatives to build a Republican Party along the lines of those
in, for example, Pennsylvania or Ohio.”).
205. See, e.g., Litigation Abuse Reform Act of 1986: Hearing on S. 2038 and
S. 2046 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 129 (1986) (statement
of Sen. Mitch McConnell) (introducing bill and describing “the dramatic increase
in the number of lawsuits filed . . . [and] the latest multimillion-dollar verdict”).
206. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth
Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 88 (1990) (arguing that after 1965 all-white juries could
legally reign in most states until the Supreme Court’s decision in Baston v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
207. See id. at 92 (finding that during the period of 1965 through 1985, “the
northern trial jury resemble[d] the all-white jury of the South”).
208. See id. at 50, 62 (“By 1870, the integrated jury was a common sight in
[certain Southern states].”).
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African-American citizens from participation as jurors violated
the Equal Protection Clause. 209 Southern states quickly found
ways to circumvent the holding. 210 In some instances, the names
of African-Americans legally required to be included within the
lists from which jury panels were drawn were printed on
differently colored paper. 211 In Mississippi, jury commissioners
selected jurors from among those of “good intelligence, fair
character, and sound judgment,” 212 language they interpreted to
exclude African-Americans. 213 Even when states used voter
registration rolls as a starting point from which to select a jury
panel, African-Americans and the poor were excluded from voting
by poll taxes and requirements that the voter be able to explain
provisions of the state constitution, again administered in a
highly discriminatory manner. 214 By the first decade of the
twentieth century, few African-Americans had served on juries in
209. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (concluding
that excluding black jurors amounted to a “denial of the equal protection of the
laws”). But see Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589 (1896) (reasoning that
nothing prevented a state “legislature from providing . . . that persons selected
for jury service should possess good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair
character”).
210. See Colbert, supra note 206, at 75 (noting that “[b]eginning in the early
1880s, the former confederate states developed and implemented strategies to
disenfranchise blacks and to prevent them from sitting as jurors”).
211. See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 72
(2007) (“White jurors’ names were printed on white tickets, while black jurors’
names appeared on yellow tickets, making it easier to determine the race of
prospective jurors.”).
212. Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592, 592 (1896) (quotation omitted); see
also Gibson, 162 U.S. at 565 (selecting jurors of “good intelligence, sound
judgment, and fair character”).
213. See Colbert, supra note 206, at 76–77 (noting that the Court in
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), “rebuked the defendant’s argument
that the state had administered the jury . . . in an evil and discriminatory
manner”); EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY
SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 10 (2010), http://www.eji.org/files/EJI%20Race
%20and%20Jury%20Report.pdf (“Theoretically valid but vague requirements for
jury service were applied in practice to mean ‘no blacks allowed.’”); see also infra
notes 234–238 and accompanying text (further discussing the use of a system
involving “key men,” jury commissioners, or elected state officials to exclude
African-American and poor jurors).
214. See Colbert, supra note 206, at 76 (noting that the “constitutional
requirements limited voting and jury duty to citizens who could pay a poll tax,
who had never been convicted of any larceny-related offenses, who could read
and write, and who understood all sections of the state constitution”).
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the South, even in counties where they dramatically
outnumbered white residents. 215
The tide began to shift against the most blatant means of
excluding African-American jurors with the Supreme Court’s
Although
1935
decision
in
Norris
v.
Alabama. 216
African-Americans were 18% of the county’s population, some of
whom were college graduates, no one could remember an
African-American serving on a jury. 217 The Supreme Court found
“it impossible to accept . . . [the] sweeping characterization” of the
jury commissioner that there was not a single African-American
in the county “who is generally reputed to be honest and
intelligent and who is esteemed in the community for his
integrity, good character, and sound judgment.” 218
In the following decades, prosecutors in criminal cases and
defense counsel in personal injury cases relied heavily on
peremptory challenges to keep African-Americans off juries in all
regions of the United States, but particularly in the South. 219
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, as late as 1965 in Swain v.
Alabama, 220 sanctioned the prosecutor’s use of peremptory
challenges to exclude all African-American jurors in criminal
cases. 221 However, during the next twenty years, it became
215. See GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW
253–72 (1910) (describing the experiences of clerks in the South with black
jurors). For example, 6,800 white persons and 8,000 African-Americans resided
in one North Carolina county, but a county clerk observed that “very few
Negroes serve on the juries . . . for the reasons that they are an illiterate race
and moral character not what it should be.” Id. at 265.
216. See generally Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (deciding the
appeal arising out of the infamous “Scottsboro Boys” case where the petitioner
and eight other young African-American men were accused, and convicted by
the jury, of raping two white women); see also N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park
Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1315, 1335–37 (2004) (discussing the Scottsboro cases).
217. Norris, 294 U.S. at 599.
218. Id. at 598–99.
219. See infra notes 220–228 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
peremptory challenges).
220. See 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965) (“[W]e cannot hold that the striking of
Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws. In the
quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and
Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without cause.”), overruled by
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
221. See id. (discussing the use of peremptory challenges).
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gradually more evident that the Supreme Court would eventually
prevent counsel from systematically using peremptory challenges
to remove African-American jurors. 222 This, of course, was
precisely the period of time when Southern supreme courts
rejected the changes in the law making it easier for plaintiffs to
gain access to juries that courts elsewhere in the country were
adopting. 223
Eventually, in 1986, the Supreme Court in Batson v.
Kentucky 224 made it far easier to prove that the exclusion of
African-Americans from the jury constituted a violation of an
African-American defendant’s constitutional rights. 225 In Batson,
the Court emphasized that the criminal defendant himself was
African-American, 226 but in 1991 in Powers v. Ohio, 227 the Court
held “that a criminal defendant may object to race-based
exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory challenges
whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the
same race.” 228 Presumably, the Supreme Court recognized that
studies have shown that African-American jurors are more
222. In the two decades following Swain, a number of federal and state
appellate courts in regions of the country other than the South held that a
criminal defendant could demonstrate an equal protection violation by proving
that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude African-American
jurors in the defendant’s particular case and need not overcome the far more
burdensome requirement that the prosecutor systematically excluded
African-American jurors across a range of cases. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 n.1
(listing cases). At the same time, federal and state courts in the South
predominantly rejected this more manageable standard. See id. (same).
223. See id. (listing cases where Southern state courts rejected these
changes).
224. See 476 U.S. at 96–97 (holding that once an African-American criminal
defendant proved that the prosecutor had removed African-Americans from the
jury venire and “circumstances raise an inference” that these peremptory
challenges were race-based, “the burden shifts to the State to come forward with
a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors”).
225. See id. at 96–97 (listing cases).
226. See id. at 96 (providing the standards for showing prima facie
discrimination in the venire selection context).
227. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
228. Id. at 402. Despite Batson and Powell, strong evidence supports the
notion that African-Americans continue to be significantly underrepresented in
criminal juries, particularly in the South. See, e.g., EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE,
supra note 213, at 14 (concluding that “peremptory strikes are used to exclude
African Americans . . . from jury service at high rates . . . , particularly in the
South”).
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inclined to vote for acquittal in criminal cases, 229 just as most
participants in the civil justice system believe that
African-American jurors favor tort plaintiffs. Most critically for
our purposes, during the same term as Powers was decided, the
Supreme Court held in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 230 that
a party in civil litigation was entitled to have his case heard by a
jury in which the other party had not excluded jurors on the basis
of race. 231 Edmondson, of course, was decided after Southern
courts disproportionately failed to follow those courts elsewhere
in the country that had already adopted substantive principles
governing tort cases that made it easier for plaintiffs to have
their cases heard by the jury. 232 After Edmondson opened the
doors to substantially greater African-American participation on
Southern juries, principles of outmoded substantive tort law
became principal bulwarks to prevent personal injury plaintiffs
from having their cases heard by the jury. 233
In the midst of the period when states other than those in the
South were changing their law to enable personal injury plaintiffs
to have their cases decided by juries, Professor Jon M. Van Dyke
published his definitive account of jury selection processes in the
various states. 234 Professor Van Dyke found that twelve of the
sixteen states in the South permitted local “jury commissioners”
or elected officials to exercise discretion in selecting the members
of the jury venire. 235 At that time, only four Southern states and
the District of Columbia selected the members of their jury
229. See Stephen P. Garvey et al., Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 371, 377 (2004) (reporting that African-American jurors
are statistically more likely to vote to acquit in criminal trials).
230. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
231. See id. at 616 (holding that, in civil cases, “race-based exclusion violates
the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors”).
232. See, e.g., supra notes 230–231 and accompanying text (discussing the
Edmonson case).
233. See infra tbl.1 (showing that Southern states disproportionately pose
the greatest obstacles to the plaintiff having his case heard by the jury);
Appendix A, tbl.2 (showing disproportionately anti-plaintiff tort doctrines in
Southern states).
234. See generally JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR
UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (1977).
235. See id. at 87 (“In the South, [some states] . . . have statutes that permit
local jury commissioners to exercise a great deal of discretion in choosing
jurors.”); see also id. app. A at 258–62.
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panels randomly from voter registration lists. 236 In contrast, the
overwhelming majority of states that were not a part of the South
selected their prospective juries randomly from voter registration
lists. The use of jury commissioners in Southern states enabled
them “to select persons they know, namely, the ‘established’
members of the community.” 237 The desired and expected result,
of course, was that both African-Americans and poor whites
continued to be underrepresented on Southern juries. According
to Professor Van Dyke’s findings in 1977—during the era of great
transformation in tort law—“the surveys from the southern
states . . . show that blacks are not filling the percentage of seats
on the juries that their population warrants.” 238
4. Resistance to “Judicial Activism”
The distinctive racial and economic histories of the South led
its political and business leaders of the region in the 1970s and
1980s to distrust both “activist” judges and newly empowered
African-American jurors. To many leaders of Southern politics
and business, the courts elsewhere in the country that changed
tort law during the late 1960s through the mid-1980s were
dominated by policy-driven “judicial activists.” 239 As such, the
more pro-plaintiff tort decisions from these courts evoked the
critics’ then-recent response to what they perceived as the judicial
activism of the Warren Court and other federal courts in
236. See id. at 258–62 (discussing the discretion granted to jury
commissioners).
237. Id. at 87.
238. Id. at 30.
239. See William M. McCormick, The American Tort System: A Time to
Rebalance the Scales of Justice, in 52 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 267, 269
(1986) (noting that “the enormous changes in legal doctrine” had occurred
“without much public debate or even notice”); cf. Irvin Molotsky, Reagan
Reiterates Support for Liability Suit Limits, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 1986),
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/31/us/reagan-reiterates-support-for-liabilitysuit-limits.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2016) (quoting Reagan administration
Attorney General Edwin Meese: “What some of the liberal attorneys and liberal
judges did to criminal law in the 1960’s and 70’s, they are now, in the 1980’s,
trying to do to civil law”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
McCormick served as CEO of North Carolina-based Fireman’s Fund Insurance.
McCormick, supra note 239, at 267.
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dismantling de jure segregation in the South. 240 Further,
new-fangled tort doctrines that focused on the policy
consequences of torts decisions, instead of on the moral
responsibilities of tort plaintiffs and defendants, 241 sounded out of
tune in the South where religious values focused on “a moral
outlook grounded in the Bible”; principles that were beginning to
reshape Southern conservative politics. 242 These factors
contributed to the decisions of Southern courts and legislatures to
decline to join the trend in substantive tort law sweeping the
nation that allowed more personal injury cases to be heard by
juries.
C. The Political Leanings of State Governments
The American civil justice system has become highly
politicized since the 1970s, and perhaps it always has been. 243
Plaintiffs’ lawyers are traditionally in tune politically with
Democrats and liberals, and businesses and insurances
240. For example, James J. Kilpatrick, a Virginia-based newspaper
columnist read throughout the country, described the Supreme Court’s decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in this manner: “In May of
1954, that inept fraternity of politicians and professors known as the United
States Supreme Court chose to throw away the established law. These nine
men . . . rewrote the fundamental law of this land to suit their own gauzy
concepts of sociology.” Court Order Gets Varied Reaction from Region’s
Newspapers, SOUTHERN SCH. NEWS, June 8, 1955, at 8; see also Michael J.
Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 487
(2005) (describing how “critics assailed Brown v. Board of Education as
unprincipled judicial activism . . . indulging in sociology”).
241. The California Supreme Court often led the movement toward more
expansive liability and explained its changes to the common law by citing policy
implications. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980)
(justifying the adoption of market share liability on the basis of loss distribution
and loss minimization).
242. See Charles Reagan Wilson, Making the South: Religion in a TwentiethCentury Region, in THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note
188, at 210, 213 (concluding that “leading denominations were among the
region’s most powerful institutions, parts of an establishment whose members
had close ties to other leaders in politics, economics, and education”).
243. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 177–78 (1949)
(claiming that the fact “[t]hat the defendant is a wealthy corporation and the
plaintiff is a poor boy . . . often determine[s] who will win or lose”); LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 365–66 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that
discontent with the tort system began as early as the mid-nineteenth century).
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companies are aligned with Republicans and conservatives. In
this Subpart we consider the possible role played by the political
leanings of state governments.
Plaintiffs’ trial lawyers, like Democratic Party activists and
other liberals, perceive that they are fighting for the “little guy.”
As Sara Parikh and Bryant Garth observe in their study of the
emergence of the plaintiffs’ bar in Chicago, plaintiffs’ lawyers
“alignment with the Democratic Party (the party of ‘ordinary
people’) reinforces their identity as underdogs fighting on behalf
of those who cannot help themselves.” 244 Liberals also see the
jury as an important democratic institution, responding to abuses
of powerful actors including both the government 245 and
corporations and other businesses. 246 In contrast, conservatives
and Republicans view tort law as yet another vehicle that
interferes with the operation of the free enterprise system. 247
These relationships echo the historical demographic patterns
of attorneys representing each party in tort litigation. Following
World War II, corporate law firms “recruited almost exclusively
from a WASP establishment legitimated with degrees from Ivy
League schools,” 248 by nature a conservative group, and most
often Republican. Those with working-class or immigrant
backgrounds, on the other hand, generally attended local law

244. Sara Parikh & Bryant Garth, Philip Corboy and the Construction of the
Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Bar, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 269, 300 (2005).
245. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L.
REV. 12, 18 (1910) (“The will of the state . . . imposed on a reluctant
community . . . find[s] the same obstacle in the local jury that formerly
confronted kings and ministers.”).
246. See, e.g., ROGER CHAPMAN & JAMES CIMENT, CULTURE WARS: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISSUES, VIEWPOINTS, AND VOICES 672 (2d ed. 2015) (stating
that liberal, consumer interest groups “argue that liability lawsuits are a means
to hold injury-causing parties accountable”).
247. See, e.g., Excessive Litigation’s Impact on America’s Global
Competitiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 8 (2013) (statement of
Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (testifying that “a
prosperous free enterprise economy . . . depends on a tort system that is . . . free
of meritless litigation and excessive damage awards”).
248. Parikh & Garth, supra note 244, at 275.
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schools, often worked with the Democratic Party machine, and
many eventually became plaintiffs’ attorneys. 249
Following the period from the late 1960s through the
mid-1980s when courts in most jurisdictions adopted a variety of
changes to the common law that benefited plaintiffs, insurance
companies and businesses responded vigorously by promoting a
wide variety of tort reform measures that limited liability. This
further politicized the tort system. As would be expected,
conservatives and Republicans most often supported the tort
reform measures, while Democrats and liberals opposed them. 250
In 1994, tort reform became a key component of Republican
Congressman Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with America.” 251 Today,
the current Republican Platform identifies “Reducing Costs
Through Tort Reform” as one example of “Renewing American
Values.” 252 Conversely, the platform of the nation’s largest state
Democratic Party, California, states that “our civil justice system
has come under concerted attack by corporations shielding
themselves from civil liability for wrongful conduct by using their
money and power to deny everyday people fair access to the
courts.” 253 The Party promises to “[t]rust juries to determine the
appropriate level of compensation for a prevailing plaintiff in a
lawsuit.” 254 Thus, by the late 1980s, the identification of
Republican conservatives as anti-plaintiff and anti-jury became
even more firmly established, and Democrats and liberals were
249. See id. at 275–77 (discussing the development and composition of the
plaintiffs’ bar).
250. See id. at 285 (describing how a law revision commission could address
issues of tort reform while avoiding political controversy).
251. See Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 699, 700 (1995) (discussing the tort reform proposals included in the
Contract with America).
252. See Republican Platform: Renewing American Values, REPUBLICAN
NAT’L COMMISSION, https://www.gop.com/platform/renewing-american-values/
(last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (stating a commitment to “aggressively pursuing tort
reform legislation”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
Report of Permanent Committee on Platform and Resolutions, REPUBLICAN
PARTY OF TEX. 10 (2014), http://www.texasgop.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/
06/2014-Platform-Final.pdf (supporting the “continuation of common sense tort
reform”).
253. 2014
Platform,
CAL.
DEMOCRATIC
PARTY
5
(2014),
http://www.cadem.org/our-california/platform/body/2014-Platform-3.11.141.pdf.
254. Id. at 5.
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even more closely aligned with the idea that personal injury
plaintiffs should be entitled to have their cases heard by juries.
As can be expected, the pro-plaintiff leanings of Democrats
and liberals led to greater financial backing from plaintiffs’
attorneys. Conversely, businesses and insurance companies
contribute far more heavily to Republicans. This, in turn,
strengthened the polarization of the two parties on tort issues.
For example, during the 2014 election cycle, the American
Association for Justice, the trade organization of plaintiffs’
attorneys, contributed more than $2 million to Democratic
candidates for Congress, but less than $100,000 to Republican
candidates. 255 At the same time, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
spent over $25 million on campaign advertisements promoting
Republican congressional candidates and a mere $375,300 on
advertisements promoting Democratic candidates. 256
In addition to these substantial contributions by lawyers and
repeat players in the civil justice system to legislators, both
groups also made substantial contributions to judicial races.
According to the National Center for State Courts (NCSC),
between 1980 and 1986, near the end of the period in which tort
law became decidedly more pro-plaintiff, campaign contributions
to candidates in contested appellate court races in Texas
increased 250%. 257 These contributions came largely from tort
reform groups, businesses, and organizations of plaintiffs’
lawyers, each with a stake in the tort system. 258
255. American Ass’n for Justice: Recipients, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL.,
www.opensecrets.org/orgs/toprecips.php?id=D000000065&cycle=2014
(last
visited Mar. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
256. US Chamber of Commerce: Summary, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000019798 (last visited
Mar. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
257. Judicial Campaigns and Elections: Texas, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_and_elections/campaign
_financing.cfm?state=TX (last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
258. See id. (reporting that of the amounts contributed to “the seven winning
candidates for the Texas Supreme Court . . . more than 40% was contributed by
parties or lawyers with cases before the court or by contributors linked to those
parties. . . .”). Furthermore, “[i]n the early 1980s, plaintiff lawyers were the
largest contributors to Texas judicial candidates, but in the late 1980s and
1990s, they were replaced by civil defense attorneys, doctors, insurance
companies, and other business interests.” Id.
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The espoused values of the Democratic Party, the often
common demographic origins of both its supporters and the
plaintiffs’ bar, and the plaintiffs’ bar’s large campaign
contributions to the Democratic Party all would lead one to
hypothesize that in states in which Democrats predominate, tort
law would allow injured plaintiffs a better chance of having their
cases heard by the jury. In contrast, one would assume that in
those states where Republicans dominate, the corresponding but
sharply contrasting factors would make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to have their cases reach the jury.
IV. Testing the Effects of Race, Income Inequality, Regional
History, and State Politics on a State’s Degree of Jury Access
Denial
To compare the extent to which each state’s substantive law
governing tort cases impedes the plaintiff’s ability to have her
case decided by the jury, we calculated a quantifiable Jury Access
Denial Index (JADI) for each state. Subpart A of this Part
describes how we calculated each state’s JADI. In Subpart B, we
rank the respective degrees of difficulty for the plaintiff to have
her case decided by the jury in each of seventeen states.
Once the JADI is available for each state, it then becomes
possible to test for correlations between each state’s JADI and the
various factors previously discussed in Part III. Appendix B,
Table 3, indicates, for each of the seventeen states tested, its
JADI and the quantifiable indices for each of the key variables
from the state, including income inequality in its largest cities,
the percentage of African-Americans in these cities, whether or
not the state was a part of the historic South, and the political
leanings of the state government. 259
Multivariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was the
technique of choice to test the impact of these variables. It is a
technique well adapted to models with various levels of
measurement. In the present case, the JADI is at the interval
level, a truly numeric variable, whereas region is a nominal
dichotomy simply divided into the South and states that were not
259.

See infra Appendix B, tbl.3 (Values of Key Study Variables).
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a part of the historic South. 260 As will become apparent, there are
complex interconnections among the model variables. In such
situations, there is a premium on tests that allow for statistical
controls to identify separate effects and test for the effects of
combinations of variables, technically termed “interaction
effects.” ANOVA offers these capabilities. 261
Given the exploratory nature of the present study, analysis
commenced by dichotomizing the key independent variables. For
the analysis of each variable, we divided states into those where
the major urban areas are characterized by a high degree of
income inequality and those with a low degree of income
inequality; those with cities with a high percentage of
African-American residents and those with a low percentage of
African-American residents; and finally, those states that were a
part of the traditional South and those that were not.
In Subpart C, we test the possible effect of a high degree of
income inequality in a state’s leading municipalities on its degree
of acceptance of substantive law doctrines that deny plaintiffs
access to juries. Subpart D tests for a possible correlation
between a high percentage of African-Americans in a state’s
leading municipalities and its Jury Access Denial Index. In
Subpart E, we test for a possible correlation between a state’s
history as part of the South and a high JADI. Subpart F
examines multivariate relations among income inequality, race,
and region in affecting a state’s JADI. Finally, in Subpart G, we
consider as an alternative explanation that a state’s JADI is
affected by its liberal or conservative political leanings.

260. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (listing the states regarded
as part of the South).
261. ANOVA is conducted by calculating F, which is the ratio of estimated
variance between separate samples to the estimated variance within the
samples. If F is sufficiently high, it indicates that the variable being evaluated
has a significant effect. The F-statistic is considered sufficiently high when the
statistical probability value (p) is extremely low. The p-value represents the
percentage probability that the difference in response values is produced by
chance or random errors. For example, a p < 0.05 means that the probability
that the difference of the means for two categories due to chance is less than 5%,
the standard for statistical significance.
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A. Quantifying the Jury Access Denial Factors for Seventeen
States
Each state’s JADI is based on a weighted sum of ratings
reflecting the extent to which the state continues to follow five
older doctrines, or sets of doctrines, that pose obstacles to the
plaintiff’s ability to have her case decided by the jury.
We begin by assigning a score to each state on each issue
ranging from 5—representing the greatest impact in denying
access to juries—to 0—representing little or no impact in denying
access to juries. In other words, on any particular issue, if a state
continues to follow the traditional doctrine that denies the
plaintiff access to the jury, we assigned a score of 5. On the other
hand, if the state now totally rejects traditional doctrines in any
of the five categories that prevent the plaintiff from reaching the
jury, we assigned a score of 0. In some of the categories, we
assigned scores between 0 and 5 because states adopted
intermediate positions or, in a handful of instances, ambiguous
rules. Finally, we more frequently assigned intermediate scores
to states on the categories of “limited-duty rules in premises
liability cases” and “other no-duty and limited-duty rules,”
because a state’s score for each of these categories included a
combination of values derived from the state’s positions on
multiple issues. 262 Appendix A provides detailed explanations for
how we assigned a state’s score on each issue. 263
Obviously, some of the traditional doctrines that blocked the
plaintiff’s access to the jury had greater impact measured across
the entire universe of personal injury tort cases than did others.
To assist us in weighting the relative importance of the five
issues, we called upon a panel of twelve experienced and racially
diverse judges and attorneys who are highly regarded by their
peers. This group included four judges, four plaintiffs’ attorneys
with varying specialties in tort law, and four defense attorneys
with varying specialties. 264 Each respondent was asked to assess
262. However, we were consistent in evaluating each category on a 0 to 5
scale. Within the last two categories, each sub-issue was assigned a number of
points reflecting its relative impact on denying jury access compared to the
other sub-issues within the same category. Infra Appendix A.
263. Infra Appendix A, tbl.2 and accompanying footnotes.
264. See supra Author’s Footnote * for a list of the experts we surveyed.
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the relative importance of state-to-state variations in the five
categories of legal doctrines described in the previous Subpart in
determining how easy or how difficult it is for plaintiffs in the
aggregate, ranging across all types of tort cases, to get their cases
to the jury. The respondents were instructed that they should
consider not only judicial dismissals at the motion for summary
judgment and directed verdict stages, but also how these
doctrines affect plaintiff counsel’s initial decision to accept a
client’s case. We asked each survey respondent to allocate 100
points among the five sets of legal doctrines reflecting the relative
importance of each, so that an issue that he or she believed is
twice as important as another issue should be allocated twice as
many points. The mean points allocated for each of the five
categories of legal issues by the twelve respondents follow:
1. The Choice Between Contributory
Negligence and Comparative Fault:
2. Limited Duty Rules in Premises
Liability Cases:
3. Other No-Duty and Limited-Duty Rules:
4. Limitations on the Liability
of Charitable Institutions:
5. Standards Governing the
Admissibility of Expert Testimony:

35.42 points. 265
12.50 points.
20.83 points.
11.25 points.
20.83 points.

We then multiplied the score for each issue in a particular
state by the weighting factor assigned by our panel of experienced
judges, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and defense counsel. For example,
because our survey respondents assessed the choice between
contributory negligence and comparative fault as having the
greatest impact and assigned it a mean score of 35.42 points out
of 100 possible points, we multiplied each state’s score reflecting
the extent to which its law on the issue of how plaintiff’s own
negligence affects her recovery—the 0 to 5 scale—by the
weighting factor of 35.42.

265. As a result of the rounding process, the mean total points allocated are
100.83.
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Finally, after we determined the weighted anti-jury score for
each issue in a particular state, we summed these five weighted
anti-jury scores to determine the state’s JADI.
B. Ranking the States’ Degrees of Difficulty for Plaintiffs to Reach
the Jury
We selected seventeen states for our study that are diverse in
terms of the following criteria: (1) the racial demographics of the
state’s largest cities; (2) a state’s history as part of the traditional
South; and (3) the state’s political and ideological leanings. For
example, in eight of our states, the population of each state’s
largest cities is more than 30% African-American; in the
remaining nine states, it is less than 30%. 266 Eight of the states
were part of the traditional South, 267 while the remaining states
were not. In 1980, near the end of the period of time when
massive change was taking place in many states making it easier
for plaintiffs to have their cases decided by the jury, slightly more
than half of our states were politically conservative. 268
After determining the JADIs for each of the seventeen states
using the methodology described in the preceding Subpart, we
ranked the states from the highest JADI to the lowest: 269

266. Infra Appendix B, tbl.3.
267. Infra Appendix B, tbl.3.
268. Infra Appendix B, tbl.3.
269. Again, we stress that our index measures only the impact of
substantive law principles applied in tort cases in posing obstacles that prevent
the plaintiff’s case from being decided by the jury and does not necessarily
reflect unarticulated tendencies of state court judges in deciding whether to
grant summary judgments and directed verdicts. Further, our measure of the
anti-plaintiff and anti-jury impact of substantive law doctrines says nothing
about whether juries themselves are biased in favor of either plaintiffs or
defendants.
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Table 1. Ranking States by Jury Access Denial Index
State
Maximum possible points

Jury Access Denial
Index
500

1.

Virginia

492.90

2.

Maryland

378.34

3.

Alabama

377.50

4.

North Carolina

335.38

5.

South Carolina

265.82

6.

Texas

265.82

7.

New Jersey

234.75

8.

Massachusetts

227.07

9.

Indiana

220.82

10.

Michigan

190.61

11.

Arizona

174.98

12.

Kentucky

166.65

13.

Kansas

137.49

14.

Florida

83.32

15.

Illinois

81.25

16.

California

52.08

17.

Washington

50.00

616

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (2016)

Our rankings do not align with the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce “State Liability Systems Ranking Study.” 270 The
substantive law governing whether a personal injury plaintiff is
able to have her case heard by the jury plays only a marginal role
in the Chamber’s rankings. 271 Instead, the Chamber survey
respondents, consisting largely of corporate counsel and other
business leaders, identified “biased or partial juries/judges” as by
far the most important factor in their ratings. 272 Not surprisingly,
this leads to the apparent anomaly that the Chamber ratings and
our JADI scores have a crude negative association. 273 However,
this apparent discrepancy can be easily explained. When
270. See generally U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2012 STATE LIAB.
SYSTEM SURVEY: LAWSUIT CLIMATE, RANKING THE STATES (2012),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/lr_FinalWeb_PD
F.pdf.
271. See id. at 3 (identifying “limits on discovery,” “elimination of
unnecessary lawsuits,” and “fairness and impartiality [of judges and jurors] as
more important factors than “tort reform”).
272. Id. at 3–4. Fully a third of the respondents mentioned this as an
important factor. Id. at 3. The report continues that the “next tier” of reasons
proffered by survey respondents “includes corrupt/unfair system (9%), a slow
process (9%), anti-business/anti-corporate environment (8%), unreasonable
rulings/verdicts (6%), incompetent juries/judges (5%), and excessive damages
awards (5%).” Id. at 3–4.
273. We compared the Chamber’s litigation climate ratings (where a higher
number is more pro-business) with our Jury Access Denial Index scores (where
a higher number makes it more difficult for the plaintiff to reach the jury and
therefore favors defendants—usually businesses and others covered by
insurance). Because we compared only seventeen states, it was not possible to
convincingly determine whether the correlation between the two sets of scores
was positive or negative. We categorized each state as a “high” or “low” jury
access denial state on the basis of whether its Jury Access Denial Index was
greater than or less than the median score for all seventeen states. Similarly, we
classified each state as a “high” or “low” on the basis of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s liability systems rankings. In twelve of the seventeen cases, a state
with a high rating on one of the variables received a low rating on the other
variable:
Low Chamber Liability High Chamber Liability
Rating
Rating
Low
Jury
Access 3 states
6 states
Denial Index
High
Jury
Access 6 states
3 states
Denial Index
This indicates that states with higher Chamber Liability Ratings have lower
JADIs and vice versa.
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appellate judges and legislators perceive that juries and trial
judges are biased, the most prevalent factor cited in the Chamber
survey, they are more inclined to leave in place older substantive
law doctrines that make it more difficult for the plaintiff to have
her case decided by the jury. The message to policymakers here is
that substantive principles of tort law play only a modest role in
determining the business community’s perception of the liability
climate.
C. The Effect of a High Degree of Income Inequality in a State’s
Leading Municipalities
To determine the effect of income inequality on a state’s
JADI, we investigated the association between the JADI and the
Gini coefficient in the state’s largest municipalities. The Gini
coefficient is the most widely accepted measure of income
inequality among economists and other social scientists. 274 A
society where all income was distributed entirely equally would
have a Gini coefficient equal to zero. 275 A totally unequal society,
where a single person earned all the income, would have a Gini
coefficient of one. 276
Rather than looking at the extent of income inequality within
an entire state, we focused only on the Gini coefficient within a
state’s largest municipalities. Publicity about “out-of-control
juries” focuses on urban juries, not those in suburban and rural
areas. In some states, a single city, such as Boston, dominates the
images that judges and legislators have about urban juries. In
other states, policymakers’ conceptions of urban jury behavior are
likely to be based on juries in a number of large cities, such as, in
Florida, Miami, Tampa, Orlando, Jacksonville, and St.
Petersburg. Accordingly, in some states we compared the state’s
JADI with the level of income inequality in only a single
274. See generally AMARTYA SEN & JAMES FOSTER, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
30 (1973) (explaining the Gini coefficient and describing it as “very widely used
to represent the extent of inequality”); David Kamin, Reducing Poverty, Not
Inequality: What Changes in the Tax System Can Achieve, 66 TAX L. REV. 593,
599–600 (2013) (explaining how the Gini coefficient is calculated).
275. See Kamin, supra note 274, at 600 (noting that the coefficient equals
zero because the Lorenz curve follows the line of equality).
276. Id.
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dominant urban center; in others, we compared the JADI with
the levels of income inequality in a number of large urban legal
centers.
We began by dividing the Gini coefficients of the cities into
those that were above the median and those below the median
and determining the mean JADI for each group. Figure 1 displays
the effect of the dichotomized Gini score on the state JADIs
shown in Table 1. The upward-trending line suggests a positive
association, with higher inequality areas showing a higher JADI
(right-hand dot) than lower inequality areas (left-hand dot).
However, this difference is not statistically significant.
Figure 1. JADI Score by Gini Coefficient277
240

JADI

219
low

Gini Coefficient

high

D. The Effect of High Percentages of African-Americans in a
State’s Leading Municipalities
We then tested the association between a high or low
percentage of African-Americans in a state’s largest
municipalities and a state’s JADI score. Our analysis paralleled
the approach used with the Gini coefficients. We divided the
cities into two groups: those where the percentage of the
population that was African-American was above the median for
all the cities we studied and those where the percentage was
277.

F = 0.249, p = n.s.
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below the median. We then determined the mean JADI for each
group. Figure 2 displays a rapidly rising line slope signifying
much higher JADIs for states in which the largest cities include a
higher percentage of African-American residents. This result is
statistically significant. Also, the difference in the two means
represented by the dots is nearly 120 JADI points, which would
suggest substantive significance as well. 278
Figure 2. JADI Score by Percentage of African-Americans
in Largest Cities 279
300

JADI

170
low

Percentage of African-Americans

278. See HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS 299–303 (rev. 2d ed.
1979) (explaining that substantive significance describes the quantity of the
effect of one variable on the other). In other words, a higher percentage of
African-Americans in the population is likely to have a large or substantial
effect on JADI scores.
279. F = 11.686, p = .001.

high
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E. The Effect of a State’s History as Part of the South

Figure 3 displays the most dramatic result thus far. States
in the South manifest a much higher average JADI than other
states, about 151 points, which translates into a clearly
statistically significant difference.
Figure 3. JADI Score by Region280
300

JADI

140
no

Part of the South?

F. Interactions Among the Variables of Income Inequality, Race,
and Region
No matter how dramatic the correlations between a state’s
JADI and either the racial composition of its largest cities or its
role as part of the historic South, neither of these bivariate
analyses should be over-interpreted because of the complex
interconnections among the variables.

280.

F = 20.606, p < .001.

yes
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Figure 4. JADI Score by Percentage of African-Americans
in Largest Cities 281
Low
High

Panel A: North

200

JADI

90
low

Percentage of African-Americans

high

281. For Region, F = 21.583, p = < .001. For percent African-American,
F = 6.535, p = .014. For Gini Coefficient, F = 0.752, p = n.s.
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350
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160
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Figure 4 justifies this reticence. Panel 4A displays the effect
of the percentage of African-Americans in a state’s largest cities
on the JADI for states that are not a part of the South. The lower,
purple line represents those cities with a Gini coefficient less
than the median, that is, a low degree of income inequality. The
upper, green line represents cities with a high Gini coefficient.
The parallel paths of these lines indicates that in states that are
not part of the South, a higher percentage of African-Americans
in the largest cities is associated with higher mean JADIs
(represented by the higher dots to the right) regardless of
whether there is a low or a high degree of income inequality.
Panel 4B, for Southern states, shows that the right-hand dot
is only slightly higher than the one at the left for the low-Gini
coefficient condition, the purple line, but the rise for the high Gini
line, the green line representing a high degree of income
inequality, is more pronounced. Nevertheless, the main upward
effect of percentage African-American persists for the Southern
states.
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The ANOVA statistical breakdown of the data displayed in
Figure 4 yields three major conclusions. First, in multivariate
comparison with these three variables, the Gini coefficient—
extent of income inequality—shows no significant separate effect.
Second, net of the other two independent variables, region—
whether a state was part of the historic South or not—exerts the
most powerful separate effect. Third and finally, the percentage
of African-Americans in a state’s largest cities exerts a significant
effect on a state’s JADI score independently of region and income
inequality.
G. The Effects of Politics and Ideology
To compare our jury access denial scores with the politics or
ideology of the state, we use the “NOMINATE measure of state
government ideology,” originally developed by political scientists
William D. Berry, Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and
Russell L. Hanson282 and widely accepted among government and
political science scholars. We compared each state’s NOMINATE
282. The NOMINATE scores measure the liberal/conservative slant of each
state’s elected officials. See generally William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen
and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960–93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI.
327 (1998); see also William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government
Ideology in the U.S. States: A Re-appraisal, 10 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 117, 117
(2010) (explaining how these “ideology indicators” help to assess both the impact
of public opinion and the policy preferences of elected officials). The scores begin
with ratings of a state’s members of Congress based on their votes on a variety
of issues and then assumes that the ideological positions of state officials—the
governor and members of the state legislature—mirror the ideological positions
of the members of a state’s congressional delegation from the same party. Id. at
118, 120.
In the 2010 indices used in this Article, William D. Berry and his colleagues
employed new input values, termed NOMINATE “common space” scores, which
assessed a broader array of congressional votes than the previous indices based
on interest-group ratings. Id. at 117. The authors report that the new input
measures yield more accurate results. Id.; see also Richard C. Fording, Updated
and Revised Citizen and Government Ideology Measures Through 2010 (Sept.
12, 2012) (providing NOMINATE values used in our study) (on file with
authors); Richard C. Fording, State Ideology Data, https://rcfording.
wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (follow “Excel
format” hyperlink under “Updated Measures of Citizen and Government
Ideology (last updated Mar. 19, 2005)” to download data through 2013) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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index for both 1980 and 2010 with its JADI. We hypothesized
that the 1980 measure of political ideology would be associated
with a state’s JADI because 1980 was near the end of the period
that the law of most states was changing substantially in a
direction allowing plaintiffs to have their cases decided by juries.
We also wanted to see whether an association existed between a
state’s JADI and the current political ideology of its government.
Figure 5. JADI Score by 1980 NOMINATE Score 283
310

JADI

140
low

1980 NOMINATE Score

high

Figure 5 shows that 1980 NOMINATE scores, reflecting the
degree of liberalism among the leaders of state government, are
strongly negatively related to JADI scores. This effect is
statistically and substantively significant. The average JADI
score is about 160 points lower when the 1980 NOMINATE scores
are high. Although the multivariate analyses are not shown here,
these effects persist even if the other two variables, the
percentage of African-Americans residing in a state’s largest
cities and whether or not the state is part of the South, are
incorporated in the analyses. In other words, as we anticipated,
higher levels of liberalism in 1980 are associated with state legal
doctrines that make it easier for the tort plaintiff to have her case
decided by the jury.
283.

F = 24.931, p = < .001.
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Figure 6. JADI Score by 2010 NOMINATE Score 284
290

JADI

170
low

2010 NOMINATE Score

high

Surprisingly, however, the 2010 NOMINATE scores are
strongly positively related to the JADI scores. In other words,
states with more liberal government leaders in 2010 tend to
follow tort doctrines that make it more difficult for plaintiffs to
have their cases decided by juries. This effect is statistically and
substantively significant. The more liberal half of the states (high
2010 NOMINATE indices) scored an average of more than 100
JADI points higher than did the more conservative half of the
states (low 2010 NOMINATE indices). The switch from the
association between liberal political leanings among state
governments and easier jury access for plaintiffs in 1980 to the
opposite result in 2010 persists even when multivariate analyses
incorporate the effects resulting from both the percentage of
African-American populations in the states’ largest cities and
whether or not the state is a part of the South.
The fact that there is a negative association in 1980 and a
strong positive association in 2010 appears to be inconsistent and
confusing. Although we cannot totally explain this result, we offer
the following observations. For most of the categories of legal
issues we evaluated, the strong movement to allow juries to
284.

F = 8.974, p = 004.
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decide more cases was already ending by the 1980s. Hence, we
believe that the NOMINATE scores from 1980, and the resulting
negative association between political liberalism and JADI
scores, is the more relevant comparison. In most instances, if a
state had not moved toward a more jury-accessible position by the
mid-1980s, it was unlikely to make the change by 2010. However,
during the same time period, the political leanings of government
leaders in many states shifted significantly, albeit in inconsistent
directions. 285 Stare decisis prevents shifts in the common law
from fluctuating as suddenly as the political leanings of
government leaders. 286 Even with these factors in mind, the
strongly positive association between political liberalism and
higher JADI scores is not one we expected. It reinforces our
conclusions that it is race and region of the country, not political
ideology, that primarily affect a state’s JADI.
V. Conclusion
Even in the twenty-first century, supreme courts in a
number
of
states
with
substantial
percentages
of
African-Americans in their largest cities, particularly those in the
South, continue to follow outmoded substantive doctrines of tort
law that make it more difficult for personal injury plaintiffs to
have their cases decided by juries. These tort doctrines are but
the latest iteration of various means used by courts during the
past 150 years to keep African-Americans from participating as
jurors in personal injury cases. Most courts discarded these
doctrines during the period extending from the mid-1960s
through the mid-1980s, during the same era when many trial
285. See Fording, supra note 282 (charting each state’s NOMINATE score
from 1960 to 2014). For example, the nominate scores became greater,
representing a move toward a more liberal electorate, from 1980 to 2010, for
Illinois (from 50.05 to 85.78) and Virginia (from 44.62 to 57.60), but Florida’s
NOMINATE scores become significantly less (71.07 to 16.82), representing a
shift in a conservative direction.
286. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3–5
(1982) (describing “the incremental nature of common law adjudication”);
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 25 (1921)
(characterizing the judicial process as “gradual” and analogizing it to a “moving
glacier. It goes on inch by inch. Its effects must be measured by decades and
even centuries”).
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judges for the first time encountered juries that included
significant numbers of African-American jurors. However, in a
minority of predominantly Southern states, appellate court
judges and sometimes state legislators apparently feared that the
Bronx jury, or more accurately the Birmingham jury or the
Baltimore jury, would redistribute wealth or exact retaliation
against businesses for past racial and economic grievances.
Twenty-first century state supreme court justices are not
going to admit that they continue to follow doctrines in order to
keep juries with substantial numbers of African-American or
low-income jurors from deciding personal injury cases. Hence, we
have been able to prove only strong correlations between a state’s
substantive law that makes it difficult for personal injury
plaintiffs to have their cases decided by the jury and the factors of
race and being a part of the South, not causation. Nonetheless,
these strong correlations, particularly when coupled with the
historical treatment of African-Americans, most egregiously in
the South, suggest that these intertwined factors explain the
continuing observance of doctrines discarded a generation ago by
the overwhelming majority of other courts. 287
Further, we obviously cannot ascertain whether the
continuing application of outmoded doctrines that restrict
plaintiffs’ access to juries that include significant numbers of
African-Americans is conscious and by design or instead
represents manifestations of deeply imbedded but unconscious
racial or class bias. Yet, as described at various points in this
Article, business leaders, defense counsel, and even some judges
and legislators have sometimes been quite transparent in
identifying
their
concerns
that
urban
juries
with
African-American and low-income jurors are likely to be unfairly
generous to plaintiffs.
When courts and legislatures today refuse to reconsider
anti-plaintiff doctrines such as contributory negligence,
restrictive rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony,
287. For example, the only four states that continue to follow the doctrine of
contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery are states located in the
traditional South where the population of its leading municipalities, with few
exceptions, is more than 35% African-American. Infra Appendix B, tbl.3.
Furthermore, of the eight Southern states in our study, six of them have the
highest JADIs of all states included in the study. Supra tbl.1.
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limitations on the liability of charitable institutions, and a wide
variety of “limited-duty” and “no-duty” rules, they justify their
decisions with any of several reasons that on their face have
nothing to do with race. They typically cite stare decisis, the
principle that judicial lawmaking under the common law begins
with the presumption that courts will follow judicial precedents
from an earlier era. However, the precedents that apply to the
issues we have considered were often decided in the decades
immediately following the Civil Rights Era when the judgment of
appellate judges in the South and elsewhere was clouded by their
apprehension surrounding the then-recent prospect of substantial
numbers of African-Americans serving on juries for the first time.
On other occasions, judges resisting a change in law that
would place them within the modern mainstream of tort law
assert that overturning anti-jury doctrines would be bad for a
state’s businesses and would place them at a competitive
disadvantage with businesses in nearby states. 288 These adjoining
states, of course, are usually other Southern states. 289 Perhaps
most commonly, supreme courts contend that any significant
change in the law should be enacted by the legislature. 290
Legislators, in turn, assert that these matters should be left to
the judiciary. 291 However, the question remains why this “passing
the buck” attitude in both the judicial and the legislative
288. Cf. Brief of the American Tort Reform Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 14, Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 69 A.3d 1149
(Md. 2013) (Sept. Term, 2012, No. 9), http://www.chamberlitigation.com/
sites/default/files/cases/files/2012/Coleman%20v.%20Soccer%20Association%20
of%20Columbia%2C%20et%20al.%20%28NCLC%20Amicus%20Brief%29.pdf
(arguing that “the adoption of comparative fault would hurt the regional
competitiveness of Maryland businesses . . . since the District of Columbia,
Virginia, and North Carolina all apply the contributory negligence doctrine”).
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 817 (Ala. 1980) (holding
that “this Court . . . should, as a matter of policy, leave any change of the
doctrine of contributory negligence to the legislature”); Williamson v. Old
Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621, 623 (Va. 1986) (refusing to adopt dramshop
liability and explaining, “we believe that a decision . . . to abrogate such a
fundamental rule . . . is the function of the legislative . . . branch of
government”).
291. See Gifford & Robinette, supra note 89, at 718 (reporting that Maryland
legislators who refused to legislatively abrogate the doctrine of contributory
negligence stated that “this is a matter for the courts to decide”).
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branches is so much stronger in some—disproportionately
Southern—states than in others.
What are the normative implications of our analysis for state
supreme courts, particularly those in the South? Courts in states
that are among the discrete minority that declined to throw out
antiquated anti-jury substantive tort doctrines between the mid1960s and the mid-1980s should acknowledge that these
precedents are tainted by their predecessors’ efforts to keep tort
cases away from juries with substantial numbers of
African-Americans. In a recent and provocative article, Professor
Barzun argues that placing a past judicial decision in its
historical context “is a legitimate . . . means of evaluating a
decision’s authority as a matter of precedent.” 292 He further
contends that it is proper for courts to “explain away whole lines
of . . . past doctrine as a product of social, political, or economic
forces.” 293
Considering the racially biased roots of the perpetuation of
doctrines that keep tort victims from the jury would not be
unprecedented. For example, when the Supreme Court declared a
Chicago anti-loitering statute unconstitutional in 1999, it rejected
the City’s argument that the fact that such “ordinances have long
existed in this country” implied that they were constitutional. 294
The Court turned the City’s argument on its head and noted that
“vagrancy laws were used after the Civil War to keep former
slaves in a state of quasi slavery” and “had especially harmful
consequences on African-American women and children.” 295
Similarly, in Mitchell v. Helms, 296 the Court rejected an
Establishment Clause challenge to the expenditure of federal
funds for books and other educational supplies for schools,
including religious schools. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court,
explicitly “disavowe[d]” the “shameful pedigree” of the Court’s
past practice of considering, in its constitutional analysis,
whether federal funds had aided schools that were “sectarian,”
292. Charles L. Barzun, Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1625, 1631
(2013).
293. Id. at 1680.
294. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 59 (1999) (discussing further the
vagueness of the ordinance).
295. Id. at 54 n.20.
296. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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noting that the use of this term “arose at a time of pervasive
hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and
it was an open secret that ‘sectarian’ was code for ‘Catholic.’” 297
So it is that the tort doctrines described in this Article that
impede the plaintiff’s access to the jury are code for keeping tort
cases from African-American juries. Past judicial decisions that
followed these antiquated tort doctrines, infused with the racial
biases of a past era, should not be entitled to the deference
generally accorded precedents. The common law preserves the
wisdom of the past. 298 It should not, however, perpetuate the sins
of the Jim Crow era.

297. Id. at 828.
298. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A
Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 183 (1985)
(characterizing the common law as “the collective and collected wisdom amassed
over decades[] of an appellate bench”).
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we calculate the JADI for each of the
seventeen states in our study. 299 We assign a score to each state
on each issue ranging from 5, representing the greatest impact in
denying access to juries, to 0, little or no impact in denying access
to juries. When a state’s law represents an intermediate position
or is ambiguous, we exercised our judgment in assessing the
anti-jury impact. Our guidelines for assessing the anti-jury
impact of a state’s choice on the five issues follow.
A. The Choice Between Contributory Negligence and Comparative
Fault 300
Anti-jury value assigned to contributory negligence states:
Anti-jury value assigned to modified comparative fault states:
Anti-jury value assigned to pure comparative fault states:

5
1
0

B. Limited-Duty Rules in Premises Liability Cases
The 5 possible points were allocated as follows:
(1) States that continue to recognize a difference between the
standard of care owed to licensees and invitees were allocated
3 points. 301 States that have abolished the distinction were
allocated 0 points. 302

299. Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.
300. Compare, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (noting that contributory negligence is
an affirmative defense barring a plaintiff from recovery), with KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 411.182 (West 2015) (adopting pure comparative fault where a plaintiff’s
recovery is limited only by percentage of fault).
301. See, e.g., McMullan v. Butler, 346 So. 2d 950, 951 (Ala. 1977) (refusing
to abolish distinction between standard of care owed to invitees and to
licensees).
302. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/2 (2014) (abolishing the distinction
between the duty of care owed to invitees and to licensees).
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(2) States retaining the “landlord out of possession” defense or
its functional equivalent were awarded 1 point. 303 States that
have abrogated the doctrine were allocated 0 points. 304
(3) States recognizing the “open and obvious danger” exception
to liability as a matter of law were awarded 1 point. 305 States
without the doctrine were allocated 0 points. 306
(4) In some instances, states follow an intermediate position or
a hybrid position on any of these issues. When a state follows
an intermediate position on either the “landlord out of
possession” issue (paragraph 2) or the “open and obvious
danger” issue (paragraph 3), we assigned a value of 0.5 points.

C. Other No-Duty and Limited-Duty Doctrines
No-duty and limited-duty doctrines arise in a variety of
contexts that are fact-specific and vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. 307 To achieve some degree of consistency, we selected
three examples of no-duty rules on which most state supreme
courts have taken a position:
(1) Dramshop Liability. 308 We allocated 2 points to states that
do not recognize dramshop liability. If a state recognizes
dramshop liability but only in tightly constricted
circumstances, we allocated 1 point. If a state recognizes a
303. See, e.g., Frobig v. Gordon, 881 P.2d 226, 228 (Wash. 1994) (“[T]he
general rule is that a landlord is not responsible . . . for conditions which
develop . . . after possession has been transferred.”).
304. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“A
lessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his lessee and
others . . . by a condition of disrepair . . . .”).
305. See, e.g., Lorinovich v. K Mart Corp., 516 S.E.2d 643, 646 (N.C. Ct. App.
1999) (“When a reasonable occupier of land should anticipate that a dangerous
condition will likely cause physical harm to the lawful visitor, notwithstanding
its known and obvious danger, the occupier of the land is not absolved from
liability.”).
306. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Andrus, 104 S.E.2d 743, 746 (Va. 1958) (holding
that land possessor is not liable for open and obvious hazards).
307. See Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing “Duty,” 79 S. CAL. L.
REV. 265, 272 (2006) (describing an “incipient trend . . . characterized by a
proliferation of highly particular determinations of ‘no duty’”).
308. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71(a) (2015) (providing a cause of action for
any “person who shall be injured” against “any person who shall, by selling,
giving or otherwise disposing of to another . . . any liquors or beverages”).
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more typical and expansive level of dramshop liability, we
awarded 0 points.
(2) Liability of Mental Health Provider to Third Party. 309 If a
state does not recognize a duty of care owed to a third party
harmed by a patient of a mental health provider, we allocated
up to 1.5 points. We awarded a state either 0.5 or 1.0 points if
liability is possible, but only in circumstances significantly
more restricted than those articulated in Tarasoff v. Regents of
the University of California. 310 If the state recognizes a more
typical standard for imposing liability, the state was allocated
0 points.
(3) Liability of the State for Harm Inflicted by Probationer or
Parolee. 311 If a state does not recognize a duty of care owed by
the state to a third party harmed by a parolee or probationer,
the state was allocated up to 1.5 points. If the potential for
liability is present, but significantly more restricted than in
other states recognizing such liability, the state was awarded
either 1.0 or 0.5 points. If the state recognizes the more typical
standard for liability for the state, the state was allocated 0
points.

We allocate fewer points for the mental health provider and
the parole/probation subcategories than for dramshop liability
because the holdings of state courts on the first two issues often
overlap and mirror each other. For each state, the point totals for
paragraphs 1–3 above are summed to determine a state’s jury
access denial points on the issue of “Other No Duty or Limited
Duty Liability Rules.”

309. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1946 (2015) (establishing a duty on the
part of a mental health professional whose patient makes a threat “against a
reasonably identifiable third person” and “has the apparent intent and ability to
carry out that threat in the foreseeable future”).
310. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 341 (Cal.
1976) (“When a therapist determines . . . that his patient presents a serious
danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to
protect the intended victim against such danger.”).
311. See, e.g., Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243, 257 (Wash. 1992) (“[P]arole
officers have a duty to protect others from reasonably foreseeable dangers
engendered by parolees’ dangerous propensities.”).
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D. Standards for Admissibility of Expert Testimony 312

We assigned each state a value of 0 to 5. A value of 5
represents the most restrictive tests for the admission of expert
scientific testimony—usually states following Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc. 313 A value of 0 represents the least restrictive
tests—usually states following Frye v. United States. 314
E. Limitations on the Liability of Charitable Institutions 315
A state is assigned a value of 0 if it has entirely abrogated
the doctrine of charitable immunity. The more limitations a state
imposes on the liability of charitable institutions, the higher the
score allocated, with a maximum score of 5.

312. Compare, e.g., Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (Md. 1978) (following
Frye), with State v. Bernstein, 349 P.3d 200, 202–04 (Ariz. 2015) (applying
amended Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert standard it
incorporates).
313. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
314. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
315. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-632 (West 2015) (providing that a
charitable hospital or related institution is not liable beyond the excess of its
liability insurance policy as long it is insured for at least $100,000).
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5424
104.15

5415
104.15

5406
104.15

0397
0

Jury Access
Denial Indices
(Total weighted
scores)
50

493

266

266

335

235

191

227

378
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Indiana

Illinois

Florida

California

Arizona

Alabama

State

% AfricanPart of
Gini
1980
2010
JADI474
Municipality American
471 the
472 NOMINATE473
coefficient
NOMINATE
population470
South?
Yes
60.95
37.04
378
Birmingham
73%
.49
Mobile
51%
.47
Montgomery
57%
.47
No
36.96
0
175
Phoenix
7%
.46
Tucson
5%
.47
No
93.79
47.73
52
Los Angeles
10%
.50
Oakland
28%
.46
San Diego
7%
.46
San Francisco
6%
.51
San Jose
3%
.45
Yes
68.80
16.82
83
Jacksonville
31%
.46
Miami
19%
.51
Orlando
28%
.47
St. Petersburg
24%
.47
Tampa
26%
.47
No
47.22
83.23
81
Chicago
33%
.49
No
31.23
20.54
221
Indianapolis
28%
.47
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State

% AfricanPart of
Gini
1980
2010
474
Municipality American
471 the
472 NOMINATE473 JADI
coefficient
NOMINATE
470
population
South?
Kansas
No
47.36
42.57
137
Kansas City
12%
.44
Topeka
11%
.44
Wichita
12%
.44
Kentucky
Yes
71.40
64.44
167
Lexington
15%
.49
Louisville
23%
.48
Maryland
Yes
82.51
80.69
378
Baltimore
64%
.50
Massachusetts
No
87.74
91.03
227
Boston
24%
.52
Michigan
No
62.82
70.32
191
Detroit
83%
.48
New Jersey
No
82.40
49.00
235
Camden
48%
.45
Elizabeth
21%
.48
Newark
52%
.53
Paterson
32%
.47
Trenton
52%
.48
North
Yes
66.32
72.96
335
Carolina
Charlotte
35%
.49
Durham
41%
.46
Greensboro
41%
.47
Raleigh
24%
.44
Winston-Salem
35%
.48
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638
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (2016)

Washington

Virginia

Texas

South
Carolina

State

Seattle
Spokane
Tacoma

Arlington
Hampton
Newport News
Norfolk
Richmond
Virginia Beach

Dallas
Fort Worth
Houston
San Antonio

Charleston
Columbia

8%
2%
11%

9%
50%
41%
43%
51%
20%

25%
19%
24%
7%

73%
42%

.46
.44
.41

.43
.41
.43
.47
.54
.41

.46
.46
.49
.46

.49
.49

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

79.67

41.22

33.23

71.16

81.73

55.22

13.44

9.32

50

493

266

266

% AfricanPart of
Gini
1980
2010
Municipality American
the
JADI474
coefficient471
NOMINATE472 NOMINATE473
470
population
South?
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317. See Williams v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Ala.
1993) (“[T]he majority of this Court, for various reasons, has decided that we
should not abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence, which has been the
law in Alabama for approximately 162 years.”); ALA. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (noting that
contributory negligence is an affirmative defense).
318. See McMullan v. Butler, 346 So. 2d 950, 951 (Ala. 1977) (refusing to
abolish the distinction between the standard of care owed to invitees and to
licensees).
319. See Allen v. Genry, 97 So. 2d 828, 831 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957) (recognizing
landlord out-of-possession doctrine with traditional exceptions, such as
knowledge and concealment).
320. See Tice v. Tice, 361 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Ala. 1978) (holding that the
premises owner “has no duty to warn . . . of open and obvious defects . . . which
the invitee is aware of, or should be aware of, in the exercise of reasonable
care”).
321. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-71(a) (LexisNexis 2015) (providing for dramshop
liability).
322. See Donahoo v. State, 479 So. 2d 1188, 1190–91 (Ala. 1985) (stating
that liability would exist if the plaintiff is able to “prove that the officials knew
or should have known that an aggressor might be a danger to a . . . readily
identifiable victim or group of victims” (citations omitted)), overruled in part by
Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So. 2d 21, 30 (Ala. 2002) (narrowing Donahoo rule to parole
officials rather than all state officials).
323. See Morton v. Prescott, 564 So. 2d 913, 916 (Ala. 1990) (acknowledging
the possibility of liability only where there is a “specific threat of harm to the
victim or to any identifiable group of which the victim might have been a
member”).
324. See Autry v. Roebuck Park Baptist Church, 229 So. 2d 469, 470 (Ala.
1969) (declining to dismiss action against church on charitable immunity
grounds); Ala. Baptist Hosp. Bd. v. Carter, 145 So. 443, 445 (Ala. 1932)
(declining to apply charitable immunity to a charitable hospital for a claim by a
paying patient); see also ALLY W. HOWELL, 1 ALA. PERS. INJ. & TORTS § 3:20
(2014) (“In Alabama, however, the judicially created doctrine of charitable
immunity is basically dead or at least in great decline.”).
325. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-160 ed.’s note (LexisNexis 2015) (adopting the
Daubert standard with exceptions).
326. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2505 (LexisNexis 2015) (providing for
comparative fault).
327. See Nicoletti v. Westcor, Inc., 639 P.2d 330, 332 (Ariz. 1982) (“The
particular duty owed to the entrant on the land is defined by the entrant's
status.”).
328. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1325 (removing landlord liability to tenant if
the property is sold and the tenant is notified of the sale).
329. See Tribe v. Shell Oil Co., 652 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Ariz. 1982) (rejecting
the open-and-obvious hazard doctrine).
330. See Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 213 (Ariz. 1983) (noting that “the
common law doctrine of tavern owner nonliability is abolished in Arizona”). But
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see Schwab v. Matley, 793 P.2d 1088, 1091–92 (Ariz. 1990) (stating that the jury
may consider defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk when
the victim was present when the driver consumed alcohol).
331. See Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227, 1235
(Ariz. 1977) (recognizing liability only if the parole board is “grossly negligent or
reckless”).
332. See Hamman v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Ariz. 1989)
(recognizing duty of psychiatrists “to protect the foreseeable victim”).
333. See Ray v. Tucson Med. Ctr., 230 P.2d 220, 230 (Ariz. 1951)
(“[C]haritable institutions are liable for the torts of their servants from which
injury proximately results to a third person, whether stranger or patient and
whether the patient is a paying or nonpaying patient.”).
334. See State v. Bernstein, 349 P.3d 200, 202–04 (Ariz. 2015) (applying
amended Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert standard it
incorporates).
335. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975) (adopting
pure comparative fault).
336. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (overturning
traditional classification system and imposing general standard of reasonable
care), superseded in part by statute CAL. CIV. CODE § 847 (West 2015), as
recognized in Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 71–72 (Cal. 1998)
(recognizing limited liability for possessors of land against an individual
committing a felony on the land).
337. See Lopez v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 821, 827 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (“[A] lessor out of possession must exercise due care and must act
reasonably toward the tenant as well as to unknown third persons.”).
338. See Martinez v. Chippewa Enters., Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 152, 155 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]the obviousness of a condition does not necessarily excuse
the potential duty of a landowner.”).
339. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (“[T]he furnishing of alcoholic beverages is
not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication.”); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West 2015) (eliminating causes of action for dramshop
liability except if licensed seller or social host serves alcoholic beverages “to a
person whom he or she knows, or should have known, to be under 21 years of
age”), abrogating Vesely v. Sager, 486 P.2d 151 (Cal. 1971).
340. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 845.8 (West 2015) (providing that neither the
government nor a public employee is liable for injury caused by parolee);
Whitcombe v. Cnty. of Yolo, 141 Cal. Rptr. 189, 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (noting
that public policy supports rejecting public-employee liability for injury caused
by parolee).
341. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal.
1976) (concluding that government-employed therapists must act “pursuant to
the standards of their profession” or face liability for duty breaches); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 43.92 (providing for liability where “the patient has communicated to the
psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably
identifiable victim or victims”).
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342. See Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241, 247 (Cal. 1951) (“[C]haritable
corporations are liable . . . whether or not a particular plaintiff has paid for the
charity received.”).
343. See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (following Frye).
344. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81(2) (2015) (codifying, with modifications,
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) and providing for pure comparative
fault).
345. See Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973) (eliminating
distinction between duty of care owed to invitees and “licensees by invitation”
and imposing a general negligence standard).
346. See Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328, 1330 (Fla. 1981) (“[The
landlord] has a continuing duty to exercise reasonable care to repair dangerous
defective conditions upon notice of their existence.”).
347. See Aaron v. Palatka Mall, LLC, 908 So. 2d 574, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (noting that liability depends on “whether . . . the owner or possessor
should have anticipated that the dangerous condition would cause injury despite
the fact it was open and obvious”).
348. See FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (2015) (establishing liability only where patron
is a minor or “a person habitually addicted to . . . the use of . . . alcoholic
beverages”).
349. See Berry v. State, 400 So. 2d 80, 85–86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(concluding that the state is not liable for negligent parole decisions under the
state torts claims act).
350. See Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(“[I]t would be fundamentally unfair to charge a psychiatrist with the duty to
warn.”).
351. See Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 199 So. 344, 350 (Fla. 1940)
(abrogating charitable immunity).
352. See Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 18 (Fla. 1985) (continuing to apply the
Frye test).
353. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (c) (2014) (adopting, in 1984, modified
comparative fault).
354. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/2 (abolishing, in 1983, the distinction
between duty of care owed to invitee and to licensee).
355. See Howle v. Aqua Ill., Inc., 978 N.E.2d 1132, 1143 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)
(acknowledging the landlord out-of-possession doctrine with exceptions).
356. See Bucheleres v. Chi. Park Dist., 665 N.E.2d 826, 831–32 (Ill. 1996)
(following open-and-obvious hazard doctrine).
357. See 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-21 (providing for dramshop liability of
those licensed to sell “alcoholic liquors”).
358. See Nat’l Bank of Bloomington v. State, 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 37, 41 (1982)
(finding state liable to estate of victim murdered by parolee through negligence
of parole officer).
359. See Eckhardt v. Kirts, 534 N.E.2d 1339, 1344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(requiring for liability that “[f]irst, the patient must make specific threat(s) of
violence; second, the threat(s) must be directed at a specific and identified

KEEPING CASES FROM BLACK JURIES

643

victim; and third, a direct physician-patient relationship between the doctor and
the plaintiff or a special relationship between the patient and the plaintiff”).
360. See Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ill.
1965) (abrogating charitable immunity).
361. See People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731 (Ill. 1996) (applying Frye),
abrogated by In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1189–90 (Ill. 2004)
(requiring de novo review of a trial court’s Frye analysis).
362. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-6 (adopting modified comparative fault).
363. See Barbre v. Indianapolis Water Co., 400 N.E.2d 1142, 1145 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980) (recognizing traditional distinctions of invitee, licensee, or
trespasser).
364. See Dickison v. Hargitt, 611 N.E.2d 691, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)
(recognizing “caveat lessee” doctrine with traditional exceptions).
365. See Smith v. Baxter, 796 N.E.2d 242, 246 (Ind. 2003) (allowing the jury
to consider liability despite open and obvious nature of hazard).
366. See IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-10-15.5 (West 2015) (requiring, for liability,
“actual knowledge that the person to whom the alcoholic beverage was
furnished was visibly intoxicated”).
367. Cf. Klobuchar v. Purdue Univ., 553 N.E.2d 169, 171 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990) (stating that “civil liability of a governmental unit may not be predicated
upon a duty owed to the public generally” (quoting State v. Flanigan, 489
N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986))).
368. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-30-16-1 (West 2015) (providing for liability
when a mental health patient communicates an “actual threat of physical
violence . . . against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims, or evidences
conduct or makes statements indicating an imminent danger that the patient
will use physical violence” against others).
369. See Harris v. YWCA, 237 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 1968) (“[T]he duty of
this Court is to repudiate the doctrine of charitable immunity and . . . it is
hereby abolished by this Court.”).
370. See Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind. 1995) (concluding that
Daubert is not binding, but helpful in applying Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b)).
371. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(a) (2014) (adopting modified
comparative fault under which plaintiff cannot recover if her degree of fault is
equal to or exceeds that of the combined defendants).
372. See Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303, 310 (Kan. 1994) (“[T]he duty owed
by an occupier of land to licensees shall no longer be dependent upon the status
of the entrant on the land.”).
373. See Colombel v. Milan, 952 P.2d 941, 943 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (“[W]hen
a landlord is not in possession of the leased property, he or she has a very
limited duty to the tenant or to third persons entering the land for defective
conditions existing thereon.”).
374. See Miller v. Zep Mfg. Co., 815 P.2d 506, 514 (Kan. 1991)
(acknowledging a general open and obvious rule, but providing for an exception
“if there is reason to expect an invitee will be distracted”).
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375. See Ling v. Jan’s Liquors, 703 P.2d 731, 735–36, 739 (Kan. 1985)
(noting that there is no dramshop act in Kansas and concluding that there is no
dramshop liability on grounds of both no duty and proximate cause).
376. See Beck v. Kan. Adult Auth., 735 P.2d 222, 238 (Kan. 1987)
(explaining that parole and probation decisions are discretionary acts immune
from liability under the state tort claims act).
377. Compare Boulanger v. Pol, 900 P.2d 823, 836 (Kan. 1995) (holding that
there was no duty of care owed to victim harmed by “alleged negligent release of
a voluntary patient . . . [and] no duty to warn”), with Durflinger v. Artiles, 673
P.2d 86, 99–100 (Kan. 1983) (recognizing claim for negligent release of an
involuntarily committed dangerous patient “as distinguished from negligent
failure to warn persons who might be injured by the patient as a result of the
release”).
378. See Noel v. Menninger Found., 267 P.2d 934, 943 (Kan. 1954) (holding
that “charitable institutions are liable for the torts . . . to a third person,
whether stranger or patient, and whether the patient is a paying or nonpaying
patient”).
379. See State v. Heath, 957 P.2d 449, 464 (Kan. 1998) (following Frye).
380. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (West 2015) (adopting, in 1988,
comparative fault); see also Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky. 1984)
(replacing contributory negligence with pure comparative fault).
381. See Perry v. Williamson, 824 S.W.2d 869, 875 (Ky. 1992)
The injured party’s status as trespasser, licensee, or invitee, is an
important factor in determining whether the possessor of land has
exercised reasonable care, but such status is by no means the end of
the inquiry. An enlightened legal system does not reason backward
from labels, to decide whether a duty of reasonable care exits. It
reasons forward from circumstances, using foreseeability, the gravity
of the potential harm, and the possessor’s right to control his
property, to decide what is reasonable conduct in the circumstances
and what is negligence.
382. See Milby v. Mears, 580 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (“The
landlord need not exercise even ordinary care to furnish reasonably safe
premises, and he is not generally liable for injuries caused by defects therein.”).
383. See Shelton v. Ky. Easter Seals Soc’y, Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 907 (Ky.
2013) (“[T]he existence of an open and obvious danger does not pertain to the
existence of duty. . . . [A] land possessor’s general duty of care is not eliminated
because of the obviousness of the danger.”).
384. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.241 (allowing liability only where patron
is a minor or where “a reasonable person under the same or similar
circumstances should know that the person served is already intoxicated”).
385. See Moore v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 715, 716–17 (Ky. 1992)
(finding no liability because the state tort claims act does not waive immunity
for regulatory acts that “have no equivalent in the private sector”).
386. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.400 (West 2015) (establishing liability
where “the patient has communicated to the mental health professional an
actual threat of physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably
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identifiable victim, or . . . an actual threat of some specific violent act [even if no
particular victim is identifiable]”).
387. See Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass’n of Louisville, 348 S.W.2d 930, 935
(Ky. 1961) (abrogating charitable immunity and eliminating distinctions
between paying and nonpaying patients).
388. See Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Ky. 1995)
(adopting Daubert standard), overruled in part on other grounds by Fugate v.
Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1999).
389. See Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 69 A.3d 1149, 1150 (Md.
2013) (maintaining contributory negligence as a bar to recovery); Harrison v.
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 898 (Md. 1983) (“[I]t [is] the
well-Sestablished law of this State that a plaintiff who fails to observe ordinary
care for his own safety is contributorily negligent and is barred from all
recovery, regardless of the quantum of a defendant’s primary negligence.”).
390. See Bramble v. Thompson, 287 A.2d 265, 267 (Md. 1972) (“The liability
of owners of real . . . property to an individual injured on their property is
dependent on . . . whether he is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser.”).
391. See Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. Ltd., 719 A.2d 119, 124 (Md. 1998)
(recognizing the landlord out-of-possession doctrine with traditional exceptions).
392. See Tennant v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Md. Corp., 693 A.2d 370, 374
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (“[T]he owner or occupier of land ordinarily has no
duty to warn . . . of an open, obvious, and present danger.”).
393. See Warr v. JMGM Grp., LLC, 70 A.3d 347, 355 (Md. 2013) (rejecting
dramshop liability by stating that tavern owners have no control over
individuals in the absence of a special relationship and thus owe no duty to
third persons).
394. See Lamb v. Hopkins, 492 A.2d 1297, 1299, 1306 (Md. 1985) (concluding
that probation officers owed “no duty” to victim of probationer who repeatedly
drove while intoxicated in violation of conditions of probation).
395. See MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-609(b) (West 2015)
(establishing liability of “mental health provider . . . [who] knew of the patient’s
propensity for violence” only when “the patient indicated to the mental health
care provider . . . the patient’s intention to inflict imminent physical injury upon
a specified victim or group of victims”).
396. See id. § 5-632 (adopted 1990) (providing that a charitable hospital or
related institution is not liable beyond the excess of its liability insurance policy
as long it is insured for at least $100,000); Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council
Home, Inc., 238 A.2d 863, 868 (Md. 1967) (declining to overturn doctrine of
charitable immunity).
397. See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (Md. 1978) (following Frye).
398. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (2015) (adopted 1969) (adopting
modified comparative fault where plaintiff cannot recover if her degree of fault
exceeds that of the combined defendants).
399. See Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973) (overturning
“the common law distinction between licensees and invitees and . . . creat[ing]
a . . . duty of reasonable care which the occupier owes to all lawful visitors”).
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400. See Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1050–51 (Mass. 1980) (“[T]he
landlord is liable in negligence for defects of which he has notice, even though
the defect occurs on the rented premises.”).
401. See Dos Santos v. Coleta, 987 N.E.2d 1187, 1192 (Mass. 2013)
(explaining that “[a] landowner . . . is not relieved from remedying an open and
obvious danger where [the landowner] ‘can and should anticipate that the
dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the [lawful visitor]
notwithstanding its known or obvious danger’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 151 (Mass. 2010))).
402. See Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 431 N.E.2d 920, 926 (Mass. 1982)
(finding tavern liable for serving alcohol to an individual who subsequently
struck “a highway traveler” with a vehicle); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 233
N.E.2d 18, 20 (Mass. 1968) (noting that a restaurant is liable for selling alcohol
to intoxicated patron).
403. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(i) (providing for no liability against
parole or probation authorities under state torts claims act except for instances
of gross negligence).
404. See id. ch. 123, § 36B (providing for liability against mental health
professionals only under highly specific circumstances).
405. See id. ch. 231, § 85K (limiting liability of nonprofit organization for
medical malpractice claims to $100,000 and for other claims to $20,000,
provided that the tort occurs in the course of activities not “primarily
commercial”).
406. See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994)
(adopting the Daubert standard).
407. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2959 (providing for pure comparative fault
except that plaintiff cannot recover noneconomic damages if plaintiff’s degree of
fault is greater than that of the other parties); Placek v. City of Sterling
Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 520 (Mich. 1979) (adopting pure comparative
negligence).
408. See Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 614 N.W.2d 88, 91–92
(Mich. 2000) (following traditional classification of land visitors).
409. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Thorn, 258 N.W.2d 30, 33–34 (Mich. 1977)
(overturning previous case law recognizing landlord-out-of-possession doctrine).
410. See Riddle v. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp., 485 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Mich.
1992) (noting that the open and obvious nature of a hazard does not preclude
land possessor’s duty, and the duty owed is up to the jury).
411. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1801(3) (providing for liability of licensee
serving alcohol to a minor or visibly intoxicated person where “the unlawful sale
is proven to be a proximate cause” of the injury or death).
412. See Harrison v. Dir. of Dep’t of Corr., 487 N.W.2d 799, 806–07 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1992) (finding no duty because no special relationship existed and
concluding that the parole board is not liable under state tort claims act).
413. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1946 (2015) (establishing a duty on the
part of a mental health professional whose patient makes a threat “against a
reasonably identifiable third person” and “has the apparent intent and ability to
carry out that threat in the foreseeable future”).
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414. See Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 105 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Mich. 1960)
(“[C]haritable, nonprofit hospital organization[s] should no longer be held
immune from liability for injuries to patients caused by the negligence of its
employees.”).
415. See MICH. R. EVID. 702 (explicitly incorporating the Daubert standard);
see also Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 408 (Mich. 2004)
(recognizing incorporation of the Daubert standard).
416. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 2015) (abrogating contributory
negligence as a bar to recovery and adopting modified comparative negligence).
417. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM
§ 51 cmt a, rptrs’ note (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (characterizing this approach as
“hybrid”); see also Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1115 (N.J.
1993) (rejecting the traditional classification approach to liability). But see
Robinson v. Vivirito, 86 A.3d 119, 124 (N.J. 2014) (stating that “the existence of
a duty by a landowner to exercise reasonable care to third persons is generally
governed by the status of the third person—guest, invitee, or trespasser”);
Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, 694 A.2d 1017, 1027 (N.J. 1997) (stating
that the status of the land visitor supports the court’s determination of the level
of care owed by the defendant).
418. See Geringer v. Hartz Mountain Dev. Corp., 908 A.2d 837, 845 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (finding landlord potentially liable for negligently
designed stairway within leased premises, even though tenant had primary role
in constructing stairway).
419. See Siddons v. Cook, 887 A.2d 689, 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(implying that there is no duty to warn if hazard is “open and obvious”); see also
Bussie v. Bloom Org., No. L-3593-03, 2007 WL 1425493, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. May 16, 2007) (stating that there is no liability where danger was
open and obvious).
420. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:22A-5 (establishing dramshop liability).
421. See Coppola v. State, 424 A.2d 858, 859–60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981) (applying N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2(a), which provides no liability for parole
decisions).
422. See McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 511–12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979) (“[A] psychiatrist or therapist may have a duty . . . to protect an intended
or potential victim of his patient when he determines, or should
determine . . . that the patient is or may present a probability of danger to that
person.”).
423. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 2015) (providing immunity for
nonprofit organization against claims brought by beneficiaries); id. § 2A:53A-8
(limiting liability of nonprofit hospital corporation to beneficiary to $250,000).
424. See Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 747–48 (N.J. 1991)
(holding that “a scientific theory of causation that has not yet reached general
acceptance may be found to be sufficiently reliable if it is based on a sound,
adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the
type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field”).
425. See Corns v. Hall, 435 S.E.2d 88, 90 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (“The doctrine
of contributory negligence has been followed in this State since
1869. . . . Comparative fault is not the law of this State.”).
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426. See Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 892 (N.C. 1998) (“[T]his Court
concludes that we should eliminate the distinction between licensees and
invitees by requiring a standard of reasonable care toward all lawful visitors.”).
427. See Boyer v. Agapion, 264 S.E.2d 364, 367–68 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980)
(adopting the Second Restatement position that a landlord is liable if he knows
or “has reason to know” of a hazardous condition and “has reason to expect that
the tenant will not discover the condition or realize the risk” (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 17.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1977))).
428. See Lorinovich v. K Mart Corp., 516 S.E.2d 643, 646 (N.C. Ct. App.
1999) (“When a reasonable occupier of land should anticipate that a dangerous
condition will likely cause physical harm to the lawful visitor, notwithstanding
its known and obvious danger, the occupier of the land is not absolved from
liability.”).
429. See Hall v. Toreros, II, Inc., 626 S.E.2d 861, 865 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)
(noting that violation of statute “can give rise to an action for negligence against
the licensee . . . by a member of the public who has been injured by the
intoxicated customer” (quoting Hutchens v. Hankins, 303 S.E.2d 584, 593 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1983))) aff’d, 678 S.E.2d 656 (N.C. 2009); Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil
Co., 505 S.E.2d 131, 135 (N.C. 1998) (recognizing common law negligence claim
against commercial vendor based upon sale of alcohol to underage individual);
Hart v. Ivey, 420 S.E.2d 174, 178 (N.C. 1992) (recognizing common law
negligence claim against social host based upon service of alcohol to intoxicated
individual).
430. See Humphries v. N.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 479 S.E.2d 27, 28 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996) (noting that no duty is owed by the Department of Corrections under
public duty doctrine for actions of a probationer unless there is a special
relationship or a special duty).
431. See Gregory v. Kilbride, 565 S.E.2d 685, 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)
(“North Carolina does not recognize a psychiatrist’s duty to warn third
persons.”).
432. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.9 (2014) (abolishing charitable immunity);
Rabon v. Rowan Mem. Hosp., Inc., 152 S.E.2d 485, 499 (N.C. 1967) (abrogating
immunity in action against charitable hospital as hospitals are profit centered).
433. See State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847, 852–53 (N.C. 1990) (rejecting
the Frye standard and substituting one based on indicia of reliability specified
by court).
434. See Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C. 1991) (“[A]
plaintiff in a negligence action may recover damages if his or her negligence is
not greater than that of the defendant.”).
435. See Singleton v. Sherer, 659 S.E.2d 196, 204 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008)
(applying traditional classification of visitors to land).
436. See Jackson v. Swordfish Invs., LLC, 620 S.E.2d 54, 56 (S.C. 2005)
(continuing to recognize “traditional rule” with exceptions for “common areas”
and “affirmative action”).
437. See Callander v. Charleston Doughnut Corp., 406 S.E.2d 361, 362 (S.C.
1991) (indicating that a land owner may owe a duty despite the open and
obvious nature of the hazard).
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438. See Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 504 S.E.2d 318, 320 (S.C. 1998) (“[O]ur
alcohol control statutes do not create a first party cause of action for an
intoxicated adult patron, but . . . they do permit a third party action.”).
439. See Rayfield v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 374 S.E.2d 910, 916–17 (S.C. 1988)
(finding that the public-duty rule precluded liability of Parole Board for actions
of a parolee).
440. See Bishop v. S.C. Dep’t of Mental Health, 502 S.E.2d 78, 82 (S.C. 1998)
(recognizing duty where “defendant [is] aware or should have been aware of the
specific threat made by the patient to harm a specific person”).
441. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-56-180 (2014) (adopted in 1994) (limiting
liability to amount recoverable under South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-78-120 ($300,000)), abrogating Fitzer v. Greater Greenville S.C.
YMCA, 282 S.E.2d 230, 232 (S.C. 1981) (“The doctrine of charitable immunity is
abolished in its entirety.”).
442. See State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508, 517–18 (S.C. 1999) (declining to
adopt the Daubert test, but recognizing that South Carolina Rule of Evidence
702 is very similar to the corresponding federal rule); State v. Jones, 259 S.E.2d
120, 124 (S.C. 1979) (identifying factors to be considered by trial court in
determining admissibility).
443. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001, 33.003–.004 (West
2013) (providing for modified comparative fault where plaintiff is barred from
recovery if “percentage of responsibility is greater than 50 percent”).
444. See Mellon Mortg. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 660 (Tex. 1999) (Enoch,
J., concurring) (stating that the “traditional classification system . . . remains
the law in Texas”).
445. See Brownsville Navigation Dist. v. Izaguirre, 829 S.W.2d 159, 160
(Tex. 1992) (retaining the landlord out-of-possession doctrine with exceptions).
446. See Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tex. 1978)
(expressly abolishing the no-duty concept in the case of open and obvious
hazards).
447. See El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 314 (Tex. 1987) (“We hold
an alcoholic beverage licensee owes a duty to the general public not to serve
alcoholic beverages to a person when the licensee knows or should know patron
is intoxicated.”), superseded by statute, TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.01–03
(West 2015) (recognizing liability when patron is “obviously intoxicated” and
“present[s] a clear danger to himself and others”).
448. See Harrison v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 895 S.W.2d 807, 809
(Tex. 1995) (finding no liability under Texas torts claims act).
449. See Williams v. Sun Valley Hosp., 723 S.W.2d 783, 809 (Tex. App. 1987)
(accepting Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal.
1976), but finding no liability “[w]here there is no allegation of a threat or
danger to a readily identifiable person”); see also Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark,
900 S.W.2d 425, 436 n.13 (Tex. App. 1995) (finding that “a threat need not be
made against a specific victim in order for the duty to warn to be imposed”),
rev’d on other grounds, 932 S.W.2d 582, 589 (Tex. 1996).
450. Although the Texas Supreme Court judicially abolished charitable
immunity in Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1971), the
legislature enacted the Charitable Immunity and Liability Act, placing limits on

650

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (2016)

tort liability. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 84.001, .006 (West 2013)
(limiting liability of a nonhospital charitable organization to $500,000 and
essentially limiting liability to a nonpaying hospital patient to $500,000); see
also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 311.0456 (West 2015) (limiting liability for
noneconomic damages of nonprofit hospitals providing substantial amounts of
charitable care).
451. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556
(Tex. 1995) (“We are persuaded by the reasoning in Daubert.”).
452. See Litchford v. Hancock, 352 S.E.2d 335, 337 (Va. 1987) (“[A]ny
negligence of a plaintiff . . . will bar a recovery.”)
453. See Appalachian Power Co. v. LaForce, 201 S.E.2d 768, 770 (Va. 1974)
(following traditional trichotomy approach).
454. See Oliver v. Cashin, 65 S.E.2d 571, 572–73 (Va. 1951) (recognizing the
non-liability doctrine with traditional exceptions).
455. See Gottlieb v. Andrus, 104 S.E.2d 743, 746 (Va. 1958) (explaining that
the land possessor is not liable for open and obvious hazards).
456. See Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621, 625 (Va. 1986)
(stating that violation of a statute does not create a duty owed to a member of
the public and recognizing that a common law action against supplier of
intoxicating beverages fails because the supplier’s actions are not a proximate
cause of the victim’s injury or death).
457. See Fox v. Custis, 372 S.E.2d 373, 376 (Va. 1988) (holding that state
parole officers did not have control over the parolee and thus owed no duty to
victims of crimes committed by parolee).
458. See Nasser v. Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502, 505–06 (Va. 1995) (rejecting
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California).
459. See VA. CODE § 8.01-38 (2014) (allowing for liability of a hospital to the
extent of its liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $500,000 so long
as the injured patient pays for the hospital’s services); Thrasher v. Winand, 389
S.E.2d 699, 701 (Va. 1990) (“It is a well-settled rule in Virginia that charitable
institutions are immune from liability based upon claims of negligence asserted
by those who accept their charitable benefits.”).
460. See Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (Va. 1990)
(rejecting explicitly Frye and following essentially the Daubert test). But cf. John
v. Im, 559 S.E.2d 694, 697–98 (Va. 2002) (warning that court has neither
adopted nor rejected the analysis of Daubert).
461. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005 (2015) (adopted 1981) (providing for
pure comparative fault).
462. See Davis v. State, 30 P.3d 460, 462 (Wash. 2001) (“[T]he duty of care a
landowner owes to a person depends upon whether the person is an invitee, a
licensee, or a trespasser.”).
463. See Frobig v. Gordon, 881 P.2d 226, 228 (Wash. 1994) (“[T]he general
rule is that a landlord is not responsible . . . for conditions which
develop . . . after possession has been transferred.”).
464. See Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 52 P.3d 472, 478 (Wash. 2002) (“A
landowner is liable for harm caused by an open and obvious danger if the
landowner should have anticipated the harm, despite the open and obvious
nature of the danger.”).
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465. See Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 96 P.3d 386, 393 (Wash. 2004)
(finding commercial provider of intoxicating beverages liable for injuries caused
by a drunk driver).
466. See Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243, 257 (Wash. 1992) (“[P]arole officers
have a duty to protect others from reasonably foreseeable dangers engendered
by parolees’ dangerous propensities.”).
467. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.120(2) (2015) (establishing a “duty to
warn” if an individual “has communicated an actual threat of physical violence
against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims” to a mental health
professional); Peterson v. State, 671 P.2d 230, 239 (Wash. 1983) (noting that a
therapist has “a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect anyone who
might foreseeably be endangered” by patient).
468. See Pierce v. Yakima Valley Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 260 P.2d 765, 775
(Wash. 1953) (“[A] charitable, nonprofit hospital should no longer be held
immune from liability for injuries to paying patients.”); see also Friend v. Cove
Methodist Church, Inc., 396 P.2d 546, 550 (Wash. 1964) (abrogating immunity
“in the case of an injured nonpaying patron” and not just “in the case of an
injured paying patron”).
469. See State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 50 (Wash. 1994) (following Frye).
470. The percentage of African-Americans in each city is taken from 2010
U.S. Census data. State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2016) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For both Louisville and Lexington,
Kentucky, this information was not available using U.S. Census data. In the
case of Louisville, we used countywide data, and in the case of Lexington, we
used the available data from Lexington-Fayette. Id.
471. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (describing the Gini
coefficient). The Gini coefficient values included in Table 3 are calculated from
the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2009–2013 American Community Survey 5-Year
Estimates. See Steve Batt, Gini Index of Income Inequality for U.S. Counties,
UCONN: OUTSIDE THE NEATLINE (Jan. 28, 2014), http://blogs.lib.uconn.edu/
outsidetheneatline/2014/01/28/gini-index-of-income-inequality-for-u-s-counties/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2016) (reporting Gini coefficients for each county) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Six municipalities included in our
study crossed county lines: Birmingham, Alabama; Chicago, Illinois; both
Raleigh and Durham, North Carolina; and Charleston and North Charleston
(combined) and Columbia, South Carolina. For each of these municipalities, we
calculated a weighted mean for the Gini coefficient.
472. See generally RICHARD C. FORDING, UPDATED AND REVISED CITIZEN AND
GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY MEASURES THROUGH 2010 (Sept. 12, 2012) (providing
NOMINATE values used in this study); see also supra notes 282–285 and
accompanying text (explaining NOMINATE values and how they are
calculated).
473. See Fording, supra note 472 (providing NOMINATE values used in this
study); see also supra notes 282–285 and accompanying text (describing what
NOMINATE values are and the process for NOMINATE calculations).
474. The JADI scores are rounded to the nearest whole number.

